走向意识的普遍理论

IF 3.1 Q1 PSYCHOLOGY, BIOLOGICAL
Ryota Kanai, Ippei Fujisawa
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引用次数: 0

摘要

尽管可证伪性作为意识理论的一个理想属性已被广泛讨论,但在本文中,我们引入了 "普遍性 "这一元理论概念,作为意识理论的另一个理想属性。物理学中通常假定的普遍性概念认为,自然界的基本规律是一致的,同样适用于宇宙中的任何地方,并且随着时间的推移保持不变。这一假设在科学中至关重要,是发展和检验理论的指导原则。当应用于意识理论时,普遍性可定义为理论确定任何完全描述的动态系统是有意识还是非有意识的能力。重要的是,要使理论具有普适性,就必须将意识的决定因素定义为系统的内在属性,而不是取决于外部观察者的解释。普遍性的重要性源于这样一种考虑,即鉴于意识是一种自然现象,原则上它可以在任何满足特定条件的物理系统中表现出来,无论它是生物的还是非生物的。迄今为止,除了少数例外,大多数现有理论并不具备这一特性。相反,它们倾向于根据对大脑功能的解释来预测意识的神经相关性,这使得这些理论只适用于以大脑为中心的系统。虽然目前的功能主义意识理论往往严重依赖于我们对大脑功能的解释,但我们认为,功能主义理论可以通过对组成概念的数学表述转换成普适理论。虽然神经生物学理论和功能主义理论在实践中仍然有用,但我们最终还是需要一种通用理论来充分解释为什么某些类型的系统拥有意识。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Toward a universal theory of consciousness
While falsifiability has been broadly discussed as a desirable property of a theory of consciousness, in this paper, we introduce the meta-theoretic concept of “Universality” as an additional desirable property for a theory of consciousness. The concept of universality, often assumed in physics, posits that the fundamental laws of nature are consistent and apply equally everywhere in the universe and remain constant over time. This assumption is crucial in science, acting as a guiding principle for developing and testing theories. When applied to theories of consciousness, universality can be defined as the ability of a theory to determine whether any fully described dynamical system is conscious or non-conscious. Importantly, for a theory to be universal, the determinant of consciousness needs to be defined as an intrinsic property of a system as opposed to replying on the interpretation of the external observer. The importance of universality originates from the consideration that given that consciousness is a natural phenomenon, it could in principle manifest in any physical system that satisfies a certain set of conditions whether it is biological or non-biological. To date, apart from a few exceptions, most existing theories do not possess this property. Instead, they tend to make predictions as to the neural correlates of consciousness based on the interpretations of brain functions, which makes those theories only applicable to brain-centric systems. While current functionalist theories of consciousness tend to be heavily reliant on our interpretations of brain functions, we argue that functionalist theories could be converted to a universal theory by specifying mathematical formulations of the constituent concepts. While neurobiological and functionalist theories retain their utility in practice, we will eventually need a universal theory to fully explain why certain types of systems possess consciousness.
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来源期刊
Neuroscience of Consciousness
Neuroscience of Consciousness Psychology-Clinical Psychology
CiteScore
6.90
自引率
2.40%
发文量
16
审稿时长
19 weeks
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