偏袒与意义

IF 1 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2024-05-07 DOI:10.1007/s10677-024-10437-0

Benjamin Lange

{"title":"偏袒与意义","authors":"Benjamin Lange","doi":"10.1007/s10677-024-10437-0","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Why do relationships of friendship and love support partiality, but not relationships of hatred or commitments of racism? Where does partiality end and why? I take the intuitive starting point that important cases of partiality are meaningful. I develop a view whereby meaning is understood in terms of transcending self-limitations in order to connect with things of external value. I then show how this view can be used to distinguish central cases of legitimate partiality from cases of illegitimate partiality and how it puts pressure on the traditional way of thinking about partiality.</p>","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Partiality and Meaning\",\"authors\":\"Benjamin Lange\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s10677-024-10437-0\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>Why do relationships of friendship and love support partiality, but not relationships of hatred or commitments of racism? Where does partiality end and why? I take the intuitive starting point that important cases of partiality are meaningful. I develop a view whereby meaning is understood in terms of transcending self-limitations in order to connect with things of external value. I then show how this view can be used to distinguish central cases of legitimate partiality from cases of illegitimate partiality and how it puts pressure on the traditional way of thinking about partiality.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47052,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice\",\"volume\":\"27 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-05-07\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-024-10437-0\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-024-10437-0","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

为什么友谊和爱情关系支持偏袒，而仇恨关系或种族主义承诺却不支持偏袒？偏袒的终点在哪里，为什么？我从直觉出发，认为偏袒的重要情况是有意义的。我提出了一种观点，即意义可以从超越自我限制的角度来理解，以便与具有外部价值的事物建立联系。然后，我将展示如何利用这一观点来区分合法偏袒与不合法偏袒的核心案例，以及如何对偏袒的传统思维方式施加压力。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Partiality and Meaning

Why do relationships of friendship and love support partiality, but not relationships of hatred or commitments of racism? Where does partiality end and why? I take the intuitive starting point that important cases of partiality are meaningful. I develop a view whereby meaning is understood in terms of transcending self-limitations in order to connect with things of external value. I then show how this view can be used to distinguish central cases of legitimate partiality from cases of illegitimate partiality and how it puts pressure on the traditional way of thinking about partiality.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

10.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Ethical Theory and Moral Practice is a double-anonymous peer-reviewed philosophical journal which aims to publish the best work produced in all fields of practical philosophy. It welcomes high-quality, rigorous and original, submissions regardless of the traditions or schools of thought from which they derive. As an editorial priority, however, published papers should be accessible to the philosophical community at large and as free as possible of unnecessary jargon. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice publishes work on ethical theories that address practical problems, as well as work that presents or examines empirical findings regarding moral practices relevant for ethical theorizing. The journal therefore actively seeks to promote cross-fertilization across areas of practical philosophy—such as moral, political, legal, and social philosophy—and more empirical disciplines, such as medicine, economics, sociology, political science, and psychology. It welcomes work in applied ethics provided that it can offer theoretical or normative contributions to larger philosophical debates. The journal also considers historically-oriented contributions provided they are not mainly exegetical and can offer insights for current debates in practical philosophy. The journal endorses the BPA/ SWIP-UK Good Practice for Journals. Further details are available in our Review Policy document.