利用技术防止全国学校考试中的舞弊行为:印度尼西亚的证据

IF 5.1 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Emilie Berkhout , Menno Pradhan , Rahmawati , Daniel Suryadarma , Arya Swarnata
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引用次数: 0

摘要

作弊降低了考试的信号价值。作弊还使教师和学生的注意力从学习上转移开来。由于学生、教师和官员都能从高分中获益,因此打击普遍作弊现象十分困难。我们评估了计算机辅助考试(CBT)的影响,这是印尼政府为减少国家考试中普遍存在的作弊现象而实施的一项大规模政策。我们利用从 2015 年到 2019 年分阶段推出该计划的机会,发现在引入 CBT 后,考试成绩急剧下降了 0.5 个标准差。在采用 CBT 之前,答卷模式显示有作弊行为的学校,其分数下降幅度更大。有计算机实验室的学校和没有计算机实验室的学校之间的影响相似,这表明作弊机会的减少是考试成绩下降的主要原因。在大量采用 CBT 的地区,仍然使用纸质考试的学校作弊较少,得分也较低,这表明 CBT 具有溢出效应。这些结果凸显了技术在提高克服教育部门合谋行为的有效性方面的潜在作用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Using technology to prevent fraud in high stakes national school examinations: Evidence from Indonesia

Cheating reduces the signaling value of examinations. It also shifts the focus of teachers and students away from learning. Combating widespread cheating is difficult as students, teachers, and bureaucrats all benefit from high reported grades. We evaluate the impact of computer-based testing (CBT), an at-scale policy implemented by the Indonesian government to reduce widespread cheating in the national examinations. Exploiting the phased roll-out of the program from 2015 to 2019, we find that test scores declined dramatically, by 0.5 standard deviations, after the introduction of CBT. Schools with response patterns that indicated cheating prior to CBT adoption experienced a steeper decline. The effect is similar between schools with and without access to a computer lab, indicating that the reduction in the opportunity to cheat is the main reason for the test score decline. In districts with high adoption of CBT, schools that still used paper-based exams cheated less and scored lower, indicating spillovers of CBT. The results highlight the potential role of technology in improving the effectiveness in efforts to overcome collusive behavior in the education sector.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.30
自引率
4.00%
发文量
126
审稿时长
72 days
期刊介绍: The Journal of Development Economics publishes papers relating to all aspects of economic development - from immediate policy concerns to structural problems of underdevelopment. The emphasis is on quantitative or analytical work, which is relevant as well as intellectually stimulating.
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