自营还是授权?知识产权衍生产品众筹供应链的决策结构

IF 5.9 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Yanhong Sun, Yanrong Chen, Xiaoxia Lin, Shuai Yan
{"title":"自营还是授权?知识产权衍生产品众筹供应链的决策结构","authors":"Yanhong Sun,&nbsp;Yanrong Chen,&nbsp;Xiaoxia Lin,&nbsp;Shuai Yan","doi":"10.1016/j.elerap.2024.101396","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Reward-based crowdfunding has become a widely adopted financing mechanism in the creative economy, particularly for IP derivative products, resulting in a typical crowdfunding supply chain comprising an IP owner, a crowdfunding platform, and a manufacturer. Our study aims to build a theoretical model to explore the strategic issue regarding how to design the decision structure of crowdfunding supply chains with IP derivative products. Our analytic results reveal that when the product quality remains consistent across decision structures, the IP owner prefers the self-operation structure (i.e., structure <em>O</em>) if the quality level is either low or high; otherwise, the authorization structures are preferred. When the platform’s commission rate is relatively low, authorizing the manufacturer (i.e., structure <em>M</em>) outperforms authorizing the platform (i.e., structure <em>T</em>), which is counter-intuitive. However, structure <em>O</em> always achieves the highest funding amount and can lead to a tripartite win–win situation under certain conditions. When the quality level is determined endogenously by the creator, in addition to structure <em>O</em>, structure <em>T</em> can also achieve the highest funding target and lead to a tripartite win–win situation in some cases by regulating the quality level. Notably, due to the double marginalization effect, structure <em>M</em> always leads to a sub-optimal outcome for the manufacturer regardless of whether the quality is constant or endogenous.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50541,"journal":{"name":"Electronic Commerce Research and Applications","volume":"65 ","pages":"Article 101396"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Self-operation or Authorization? Decision structure of crowdfunding supply chains with IP derivative products\",\"authors\":\"Yanhong Sun,&nbsp;Yanrong Chen,&nbsp;Xiaoxia Lin,&nbsp;Shuai Yan\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.elerap.2024.101396\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Reward-based crowdfunding has become a widely adopted financing mechanism in the creative economy, particularly for IP derivative products, resulting in a typical crowdfunding supply chain comprising an IP owner, a crowdfunding platform, and a manufacturer. Our study aims to build a theoretical model to explore the strategic issue regarding how to design the decision structure of crowdfunding supply chains with IP derivative products. Our analytic results reveal that when the product quality remains consistent across decision structures, the IP owner prefers the self-operation structure (i.e., structure <em>O</em>) if the quality level is either low or high; otherwise, the authorization structures are preferred. When the platform’s commission rate is relatively low, authorizing the manufacturer (i.e., structure <em>M</em>) outperforms authorizing the platform (i.e., structure <em>T</em>), which is counter-intuitive. However, structure <em>O</em> always achieves the highest funding amount and can lead to a tripartite win–win situation under certain conditions. When the quality level is determined endogenously by the creator, in addition to structure <em>O</em>, structure <em>T</em> can also achieve the highest funding target and lead to a tripartite win–win situation in some cases by regulating the quality level. Notably, due to the double marginalization effect, structure <em>M</em> always leads to a sub-optimal outcome for the manufacturer regardless of whether the quality is constant or endogenous.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":50541,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Electronic Commerce Research and Applications\",\"volume\":\"65 \",\"pages\":\"Article 101396\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":5.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-04-04\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Electronic Commerce Research and Applications\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1567422324000413\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Electronic Commerce Research and Applications","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1567422324000413","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

以奖励为基础的众筹已成为创意经济中广泛采用的融资机制,尤其是针对知识产权衍生产品的众筹,形成了一个由知识产权所有者、众筹平台和制造商组成的典型众筹供应链。我们的研究旨在建立一个理论模型,探讨如何设计知识产权衍生产品众筹供应链决策结构的战略问题。我们的分析结果表明,当产品质量在不同决策结构中保持一致时,如果产品质量水平较低或较高,知识产权所有者更倾向于自主经营结构(即结构 O);反之,则更倾向于授权结构。当平台佣金率相对较低时,授权制造商(即结构 M)优于授权平台(即结构 T),这与直觉相反。然而,结构 O 总能获得最高的资助额,并在特定条件下实现三方共赢。当质量水平由创作者内生决定时,除结构 O 外,结构 T 在某些情况下也能通过调节质量水平实现最高的资助目标,并导致三方共赢。值得注意的是,由于双重边缘化效应,无论质量是恒定的还是内生的,结构 M 总会导致制造商的次优结果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Self-operation or Authorization? Decision structure of crowdfunding supply chains with IP derivative products

Reward-based crowdfunding has become a widely adopted financing mechanism in the creative economy, particularly for IP derivative products, resulting in a typical crowdfunding supply chain comprising an IP owner, a crowdfunding platform, and a manufacturer. Our study aims to build a theoretical model to explore the strategic issue regarding how to design the decision structure of crowdfunding supply chains with IP derivative products. Our analytic results reveal that when the product quality remains consistent across decision structures, the IP owner prefers the self-operation structure (i.e., structure O) if the quality level is either low or high; otherwise, the authorization structures are preferred. When the platform’s commission rate is relatively low, authorizing the manufacturer (i.e., structure M) outperforms authorizing the platform (i.e., structure T), which is counter-intuitive. However, structure O always achieves the highest funding amount and can lead to a tripartite win–win situation under certain conditions. When the quality level is determined endogenously by the creator, in addition to structure O, structure T can also achieve the highest funding target and lead to a tripartite win–win situation in some cases by regulating the quality level. Notably, due to the double marginalization effect, structure M always leads to a sub-optimal outcome for the manufacturer regardless of whether the quality is constant or endogenous.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications 工程技术-计算机:跨学科应用
CiteScore
10.10
自引率
8.30%
发文量
97
审稿时长
63 days
期刊介绍: Electronic Commerce Research and Applications aims to create and disseminate enduring knowledge for the fast-changing e-commerce environment. A major dilemma in e-commerce research is how to achieve a balance between the currency and the life span of knowledge. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications will contribute to the establishment of a research community to create the knowledge, technology, theory, and applications for the development of electronic commerce. This is targeted at the intersection of technological potential and business aims.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信