{"title":"政治不确定性与诉讼效率:来自中国的证据","authors":"Yuexin Huang, Ruijing Li, Danglun Luo, Rongli Yuan","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12276","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this article, we investigate the influence of local official turnover on litigation efficiency using manually collected data from listed companies in China from 1995 to 2013. Our findings indicate that official turnover leads to a decrease in litigation efficiency, with a 16.3% increase in the duration of litigation cases. This effect is more pronounced when newly appointed officials are working in different locations. It is more significant when the involved enterprise is a private entity, suggesting that political cycles contribute to the selective enforcement of private enterprises. Further analysis reveals that the adverse impact of official turnover on litigation efficiency is short-lived. The conclusions contribute to the existing literature on official turnover and litigation efficiency and hold potential implications for judicial independence reforms.</p>","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":"36 2","pages":"1020-1055"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Political uncertainty and litigation efficiency: Evidence from China\",\"authors\":\"Yuexin Huang, Ruijing Li, Danglun Luo, Rongli Yuan\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/ecpo.12276\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>In this article, we investigate the influence of local official turnover on litigation efficiency using manually collected data from listed companies in China from 1995 to 2013. Our findings indicate that official turnover leads to a decrease in litigation efficiency, with a 16.3% increase in the duration of litigation cases. This effect is more pronounced when newly appointed officials are working in different locations. It is more significant when the involved enterprise is a private entity, suggesting that political cycles contribute to the selective enforcement of private enterprises. Further analysis reveals that the adverse impact of official turnover on litigation efficiency is short-lived. The conclusions contribute to the existing literature on official turnover and litigation efficiency and hold potential implications for judicial independence reforms.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47220,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Economics & Politics\",\"volume\":\"36 2\",\"pages\":\"1020-1055\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-02-25\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Economics & Politics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecpo.12276\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economics & Politics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecpo.12276","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Political uncertainty and litigation efficiency: Evidence from China
In this article, we investigate the influence of local official turnover on litigation efficiency using manually collected data from listed companies in China from 1995 to 2013. Our findings indicate that official turnover leads to a decrease in litigation efficiency, with a 16.3% increase in the duration of litigation cases. This effect is more pronounced when newly appointed officials are working in different locations. It is more significant when the involved enterprise is a private entity, suggesting that political cycles contribute to the selective enforcement of private enterprises. Further analysis reveals that the adverse impact of official turnover on litigation efficiency is short-lived. The conclusions contribute to the existing literature on official turnover and litigation efficiency and hold potential implications for judicial independence reforms.
期刊介绍:
Economics & Politics focuses on analytical political economy, broadly defined as the study of economic and political phenomena and policy in models that include political processes, institutions and markets. The journal is the source for innovative theoretical and empirical work on the intersection of politics and economics, at both domestic and international levels, and aims to promote new approaches on how these forces interact to affect political outcomes and policy choices, economic performance and societal welfare. Economics & Politics is a vital source of information for economists, academics and students, providing: - Analytical political economics - International scholarship - Accessible & thought-provoking articles - Creative inter-disciplinary analysis