轨道上的法律:从国际法律角度看针对空间系统的网络攻击

IF 5.9 2区 管理学 Q1 COMMUNICATION
Brianna Bace , Yasir Gökce , Unal Tatar
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引用次数: 0

摘要

空间部门的系统实现了许多关键功能,并经常被整合到现有的电信基础设施中,以提高网络连接的覆盖范围和能力。在网络威胁不断升级的情况下,本文探讨了国际法在针对空间基础设施的网络行动中的适用性,弥补了论述中的一个重要空白。虽然全球实体的声明都确认国际法适用于网络攻击,但网络空间的复杂性以及空间基础设施的独特性给实施带来了挑战。本研究认识到全球网络法的缺失,以及缺乏关于空间基础设施网络行动的习惯国际法,因此通过案例分析,从国际人道主义法、武装冲突法和外层空间法的角度,对陆地和轨道空间基础设施遭受的网络攻击进行了首次法律审查。本文采用综合方法,在回顾国际法的三大原则:一般主权原则、禁止干涉原则和禁止使用武力原则时,考虑了不同国家的观点。根据我们对三种假设但现实的网络行动场景的分析,国际法可适用于对空间基础设施的网络攻击,如果满足特定法律的所有条件,并可将其归咎于国家行为者,则可能发生违法行为。然而,事实证明,在网络环境中适用这些法律会带来一些复杂性和分歧,如果忽视现实,即仍然存在重大的模糊性和不同的解释,那将是错误的,这可能会阻碍这些法律在此类场景中的明确执行和适用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Law in orbit: International legal perspectives on cyberattacks targeting space systems

Space sector systems enable numerous critical functions and are often integrated into existing telecommunications infrastructure to enhance network connectivity coverage and capacity. Amid escalating cyber threats, this paper examines the application of international law to cyber operations targeting space infrastructure, addressing a critical gap in discourse. While declarations by global entities affirm the applicability of international law to cyberattacks, the complexities of cyberspace, compounded by the unique aspects of space infrastructure, pose challenges in implementation. Recognizing the absence of global cyber law and a lack of customary international law regarding cyber operations on space infrastructure, this study provides one of the first legal examinations via case analysis of cyberattacks on space infrastructures, both terrestrial and orbital, through the lens of international humanitarian law, the law of armed conflict, and outer space law. This paper adopts a comprehensive approach, considering perspectives from differing national stances as we review three main principles of international law: the general principle of sovereignty, the prohibition of intervention, and the prohibition of the use of force. Based on our analysis of three hypothetical but realistic cyber operation scenarios, international law can apply to cyberattacks on space infrastructure, and violations can occur if all conditions of a given law are met and attribution can be made to a state actor. Yet, applying these laws in a cyber context has proven to cause some complexities and disagreements, and it would be a mistake to ignore the reality that there is still significant ambiguity and varying interpretations, which could impede the unequivocal enforcement and application of these laws in such scenarios.

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来源期刊
Telecommunications Policy
Telecommunications Policy 工程技术-电信学
CiteScore
10.80
自引率
12.50%
发文量
122
审稿时长
38 days
期刊介绍: Telecommunications Policy is concerned with the impact of digitalization in the economy and society. The journal is multidisciplinary, encompassing conceptual, theoretical and empirical studies, quantitative as well as qualitative. The scope includes policy, regulation, and governance; big data, artificial intelligence and data science; new and traditional sectors encompassing new media and the platform economy; management, entrepreneurship, innovation and use. Contributions may explore these topics at national, regional and international levels, including issues confronting both developed and developing countries. The papers accepted by the journal meet high standards of analytical rigor and policy relevance.
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