捍卫（感知）态度

IF 0.7 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-02-16 DOI:10.1111/ejop.12933

Valentina Martinis

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引用次数: 0

摘要

在本文中，我为意向心理状态的三元形而上学辩护，根据这一形而上学，心理状态被分为主体、内容和态度，反对最近试图消除态度部分的尝试（例如，蒙塔古，《牛津心灵哲学研究》，2022 年第 2 期，牛津大学出版社）。我认为，仅由主体和内容构成的形而上学无法解释（a）多感官知觉体验和（b）知觉与想象之间的现象学差异。最后，我提出，拒绝态度成分背后的一些动机可以在三方框架内得到解决。

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Defending (perceptual) attitudes

In this paper, I defend a tripartite metaphysics of intentional mental states, according to which mental states are divided into subject, content, and attitude, against recent attempts at eliminating the attitude component (e.g., Montague, Oxford studies in philosophy of mind, 2022, 2, Oxford University Press). I suggest that a metaphysics composed of only subject and content cannot account for (a) multisensory perceptual experiences and (b) phenomenological differences between episodes of perception and imagination. Finally, I suggest that some of the motivations behind the rejection of the attitude component can be accommodated within the tripartite framework.

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来源期刊

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.50

自引率

11.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： ''Founded by Mark Sacks in 1993, the European Journal of Philosophy has come to occupy a distinctive and highly valued place amongst the philosophical journals. The aim of EJP has been to bring together the best work from those working within the "analytic" and "continental" traditions, and to encourage connections between them, without diluting their respective priorities and concerns. This has enabled EJP to publish a wide range of material of the highest standard from philosophers across the world, reflecting the best thinking from a variety of philosophical perspectives, in a way that is accessible to all of them.''