董事自我交易：来自薪酬同侪群体的证据

IF 7.2 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-02-14 DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102560

Melissa B. Frye , Vladimir A. Gatchev , Duong T. Pham

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们发现，董事薪酬，尤其是基于股权的部分，与同行公司的董事薪酬呈正相关，这表明董事会在制定自己的薪酬时是以同行为基准的。这种基准与首席执行官薪酬的同行基准不同。我们还发现，在同行选择中，董事薪酬相对较高的同行存在明显偏向，这有助于提高董事会薪酬。在机构投资者参与度低（高）的公司和盈利能力下降（上升）的公司中，董事薪酬的同行基准更为明显（不那么明显）。总体而言，我们的研究结果与董事在选择薪酬同行时的自我交易行为一致，但对公司并无明显益处。

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Director self-dealing: Evidence from compensation peer groups

We find that director pay, especially the equity-based portion, is positively related to peer firms' director pay, suggesting boards benchmark when establishing their own compensation. Such benchmarking is distinct from peer benchmarking in CEO pay. We also find a significant bias in peer selection towards peers with relatively high director pay, which helps increase board pay. Peer benchmarking of director compensation is more (less) pronounced in firms with low (high) involvement by institutional investors and firms with declining (increasing) profitability. Overall, our results are consistent with directors engaging in self-dealing when selecting compensation peers, without clear benefits to the firm.

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来源期刊

Journal of Corporate Finance BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

11.80

自引率

3.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Corporate Finance aims to publish high quality, original manuscripts that analyze issues related to corporate finance. Contributions can be of a theoretical, empirical, or clinical nature. Topical areas of interest include, but are not limited to: financial structure, payout policies, corporate restructuring, financial contracts, corporate governance arrangements, the economics of organizations, the influence of legal structures, and international financial management. Papers that apply asset pricing and microstructure analysis to corporate finance issues are also welcome.