40 年后垄断监管的贝叶斯方法

IF 1.4 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-22 DOI:10.1007/s11149-023-09470-1

Ismail Saglam

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文采用贝叶斯方法对垄断监管文献进行了研究。这些文献以 Baron 和 Myerson 于 1982 年发表的开创性论文 "对未知成本垄断者的监管 "为基础。在介绍了他们对规制文献的贡献后，本文讨论了对其模型的主要批评，这些批评涉及对贝叶斯规制者的信息假设或承诺假设。本文还简要回顾了一些非贝叶斯激励方案、价格上限规制以及巴隆和迈尔森规制模型的若干扩展和应用，以突出 40 年后新规制经济学的演变和范围。

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The Bayesian approach to monopoly regulation after 40 years

This paper surveys the monopoly regulation literature with the Bayesian approach. The literature builds on Baron and Myerson’s seminal 1982 paper, entitled “Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs.” After presenting their contributions to the regulation literature, the paper discusses the main criticisms of their model, relating to either informational or commitment assumptions about the Bayesian regulator. The paper also briefly reviews some non-Bayesian incentive schemes, price-cap regulation, and several extensions and applications of Baron and Myerson’s regulatory model to highlight the evolution and scope of the new economics of regulation after 40 years.

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来源期刊

Journal of Regulatory Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Recent legislative and policy reforms have changed the nature of regulation. Partial deregulation has created a new dimension to regulatory problems, as the debate is extended to include diversification and new forms of regulation. The introduction of incentive-based rate schedules and ratemaking procedures, the integration of demand-side programs with planning for capitol expansion, and other developments, raise a host of theoretical and empirical questions. The Journal of Regulatory Economics serves as a high quality forum for the analysis of regulatory theories and institutions by developing the rigorous economics foundations of regulation. Both theoretical and applied works, including experimental research, are encouraged. Research in all aspects of regulation is of interest including traditional problems of natural monopoly, antitrust and competition policy, incentive regulation, deregulation, auction theory, new policy instruments, health and safety regulation, environmental regulation, insurance and financial regulation, hazardous and solid waste regulation, universal service obligation, and consumer product regulation. The JRE provides researchers, policy-makers, and institutions with current perspectives on the theory and practice of economics of regulation. While there are a number of journals and magazines that include the study of regulation, the JRE is unique in that it fills a gap in the market for a high quality journal dealing solely with the economics of regulation.Officially cited as: J Regul Econ