杰弗里有条件许可证破坏了

IF 0.7 1区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC Pub Date : 2024-01-22 DOI:10.1007/s10992-024-09741-y

Marc Lange

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引用次数: 0

摘要

最近经常有人认为，杰弗里条件化（JC）不允许破坏。如果在证据可能被削弱的情况下，JC 不适用，JC 的适用范围就会大打折扣。然而，本文认为，这一论点未能证明 JC 不能容许破坏。这一回应的关键在于使用适当的分区来捕捉我们的证据在重新分配我们的可信度时所产生的直接影响。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Jeffrey Conditionalization Permits Undermining

It has frequently been argued recently that Jeffrey Conditionalization (JC) does not permit undermining. For JC to be inapplicable in cases where the evidence could be undermined would severely compromise JC’s range. However, this paper contends that the argument fails to show that JC cannot accommodate undermining. This response turns on using the proper partition to capture the direct impact of our evidence in redistributing our credences.

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来源期刊

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

2.50

自引率

20.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Philosophical Logic aims to provide a forum for work at the crossroads of philosophy and logic, old and new, with contributions ranging from conceptual to technical. Accordingly, the Journal invites papers in all of the traditional areas of philosophical logic, including but not limited to: various versions of modal, temporal, epistemic, and deontic logic; constructive logics; relevance and other sub-classical logics; many-valued logics; logics of conditionals; quantum logic; decision theory, inductive logic, logics of belief change, and formal epistemology; defeasible and nonmonotonic logics; formal philosophy of language; vagueness; and theories of truth and validity. In addition to publishing papers on philosophical logic in this familiar sense of the term, the Journal also invites papers on extensions of logic to new areas of application, and on the philosophical issues to which these give rise. The Journal places a special emphasis on the applications of philosophical logic in other disciplines, not only in mathematics and the natural sciences but also, for example, in computer science, artificial intelligence, cognitive science, linguistics, jurisprudence, and the social sciences, such as economics, sociology, and political science.