Putnam and Dennett on instrumentalism and the intentional

This paper examines Dennett’s conceptions of intentionality and consciousness—focused on his concept of the intentional stance (Dennett, 1987,1991b). It chiefly proceeds from a series of critical remarks due to Putnam (Putnam, 1999). Dennett has written extensively on the philosophy of mind; his work includes many scholarly and scientific contributions. He has attracted much attention to the philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology, and computer science; and he is an important critic of alternative views and theorists in related fields. The present paper draws on critical departures from Quine’s physicalism in publications of Putnam and Davidson (Davidson, 1963,1997); and it examines criticism brought against Dennett’s work on grounds of forms of instrumentalism and antirealism in the intentional stance. Evaluating Dennett’s posi¬tions and Putnam’s critical perspectives turn largely on understanding the relation of Dennett on intentionality, consciousness and the mental to formative and controversial theses of his acknowledged mentor, Quine (Quine, 1960). It will be argued that Dennett’s version of functionalism is best understood as a sophisticated physicalism, antirealism, and quasi-behaviorism in cognitive science.