通过秘密纵向合同进行信息交流

IF 1.2 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-12-21 DOI:10.1007/s00199-023-01539-4

Jihwan Do, Nicolás Riquelme

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了一个共同代理问题，在这个问题中，两家下游企业都是本地垄断企业，接收私人需求信号，向其共同供应商提供由两部分组成的关税合同秘密菜单。虽然不可能进行直接沟通，但它们仍可通过垂直合同的信号权变菜单交换信息。我们的研究表明，存在一个完美的贝叶斯均衡，在这个均衡中，信息得以传递，下游企业几乎可以获得第一最优的行业盈余。要取得这样的结果，必须同时使用固定收费和时段费。我们的分析为在纵向合同中使用时段费提供了一种新的解释，这种解释基于时段费作为信息传递工具的价值。

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Information exchange through secret vertical contracts

We study a common agency problem in which two downstream firms, who are local monopolists and receive private demand signals, offer secret menus of two-part tariff contracts to their common supplier. While direct communication is not possible, they may still exchange their information through signal-contingent menus of vertical contracts. We show that a perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists in which information is transmitted, and downstream firms obtain nearly the first-best industry surplus. The use of both fixed charges and slotting fees is necessary for such a result. Our analysis provides a novel explanation for the use of slotting fees in vertical contracting based on its value as an information transmission device.

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来源期刊

Economic Theory ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.50

自引率

23.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： The purpose of Economic Theory is to provide an outlet for research - in all areas of economics based on rigorous theoretical reasoning, and - on specific topics in mathematics which is motivated by the analysis of economic problems. Economic Theory''s scope encompasses - but is not limited to - the following fields. - classical and modern equilibrium theory - cooperative and non-cooperative game theory - macroeconomics - social choice and welfare - uncertainty and information, intertemporal economics (including dynamical systems) - public economics - international and developmental economics - financial economics, money and banking - industrial organization Economic Theory also publishes surveys if they clearly picture the basic ideas at work in some areas, the essential technical apparatus which is used and the central questions which remain open. The development of a productive dialectic between stylized facts and abstract formulations requires that economic relevance be at the forefront. Thus, correct, and innovative, mathematical analysis is not enough; it must be motivated by - and contribute to - the understanding of substantive economic problems. Officially cited as: Econ Theory