物质是否具有非处置性的内在品质?悉尼-肖伊梅克反对奎德主义

D. Sepetyi
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引用次数: 0

摘要

文章讨论了物质的基本非处置性内在品质(阙如)的存在问题,以及阙如主义和处置主义(因果结构主义)这两种相反观点的论据。霍华德-罗宾逊(Howard Robinson)、约翰-福斯特(John Foster)和菲利普-戈夫(Philip Goff)的论点支持 "阙德论"。这些论点强调,整个现实只是一个因果关系网络,网络的节点没有任何定性填充物,这种学说是不连贯的或不可理解的。文章分析并回应了悉尼-舒梅克(Sydney Shoemaker)在《因果性与属性》一文中对处置主义提出的有影响力的论点。文章指出,肖梅克反对基本属性的存在,因为基本属性的特性 "在逻辑上独立于其因果潜能",而我们的世界是由本体论上的基本自然法则运作的,根据这些自然法则,阙德具有恒定的因果潜能。有了这一假设,我们就有可能知道与处置论相同的物质属性,即处置属性和时空关系。因此,在舒梅克看来,它没有 "灾难性的认识论后果"。虽然与处置论相比,这种 "阙德论 "扩大了本体论的范围,它不仅赋予物质以可知的处置属性(因果结构),而且赋予物质以在某种意义上不可知的 "阙德",但这种本体论的夸张是合理的,因为需要避免处置论所带来的权力的恶性倒退。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Does matter have non-dispositional intrinsic qualities? Sydney Shoеmaker against quidditism
The article discusses the problem of the existence of the fundamental non-dispositional intrinsic qualities of matter (quiddities) and arguments for two opposite views, quidditism and dispositionalism (causal structuralism). In support of quidditism, arguments by Howard Robinson, John Foster and Philip Goff are deployed. These arguments highlight the incoherence or unintelligibility of the doctrine that the whole reality is just a network of causal relations without any qualitative filler in the nodes of the network. Sydney Shoemaker’s influential argument for dispositionalism, in the article “Causality and Properties”, is analysed and responded. The case is made that Shoemaker’s objections against the existence of fundamental properties whose identity “consists of something logically independent of their causal potentialities” can be neutralised on the assumption that our world is operated by ontologically fundamental laws of nature in virtue of which quiddities have constant causal potentialities. Quidditism with this assumption makes it possible to know all the same properties of matter as dispositionalism, viz., dispositional properties and spatiotemporal relations. So, pace Shoemaker, it has no “disastrous epistemological consequences”. Although such quidditism expands (as compared with dispositionalism) ontology by attributing matter not only with knowable dispositional properties (causal structures) but also with quiddities, which are in a sense unknowable, this ontological exuberance is justified by the need to avoid the vicious regress of powers entailed by dispositionalism.
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