亲密无间的邻里关系：网络合作的稳定性

IF 1.4 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory Pub Date : 2023-12-19 DOI:10.1016/j.jet.2023.105775

Arnold Polanski

{"title":"亲密无间的邻里关系：网络合作的稳定性","authors":"Arnold Polanski","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2023.105775","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Agents connected in a network face a binary choice whether to contribute or to free-ride. The former action is costly but benefits the agent and her neighbors, while the latter is free, but does not provide any benefits. Who will contribute if agents are farsighted and not constrained by a fixed non-cooperative protocol? I adapt the concepts of consistent sets and farsightedly stable sets to answer this question. When benefits to an agent are linear in the number of her contributing neighbors, the decision to contribute depends on the cohesion of her neighborhood as captured by the graph-theoretical concept of k-cores.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Close-knit neighborhoods: Stability of cooperation in networks\",\"authors\":\"Arnold Polanski\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jet.2023.105775\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Agents connected in a network face a binary choice whether to contribute or to free-ride. The former action is costly but benefits the agent and her neighbors, while the latter is free, but does not provide any benefits. Who will contribute if agents are farsighted and not constrained by a fixed non-cooperative protocol? I adapt the concepts of consistent sets and farsightedly stable sets to answer this question. When benefits to an agent are linear in the number of her contributing neighbors, the decision to contribute depends on the cohesion of her neighborhood as captured by the graph-theoretical concept of k-cores.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48393,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Economic Theory\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-12-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Economic Theory\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053123001710\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Economic Theory","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053123001710","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

连接在网络中的代理人面临着二元选择，是贡献还是搭便车。前者代价高昂，但能使代理及其邻居受益；后者免费，但不能带来任何好处。如果代理人有远见且不受固定的非合作协议限制，谁会做出贡献呢？我调整了一致集和远视稳定集的概念来回答这个问题。当一个代理的收益与其贡献邻居的数量呈线性关系时，其贡献的决定就取决于其邻居的凝聚力，这一点可以用图理论中的 k 核心概念来体现。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Close-knit neighborhoods: Stability of cooperation in networks

Agents connected in a network face a binary choice whether to contribute or to free-ride. The former action is costly but benefits the agent and her neighbors, while the latter is free, but does not provide any benefits. Who will contribute if agents are farsighted and not constrained by a fixed non-cooperative protocol? I adapt the concepts of consistent sets and farsightedly stable sets to answer this question. When benefits to an agent are linear in the number of her contributing neighbors, the decision to contribute depends on the cohesion of her neighborhood as captured by the graph-theoretical concept of k-cores.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Journal of Economic Theory ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.50

自引率

12.50%

发文量

135

期刊介绍： The Journal of Economic Theory publishes original research on economic theory and emphasizes the theoretical analysis of economic models, including the study of related mathematical techniques. JET is the leading journal in economic theory. It is also one of nine core journals in all of economics. Among these journals, the Journal of Economic Theory ranks fourth in impact-adjusted citations.