基于参考依赖偏好的和解谈判

IF 1 3区 社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Christoph Rössler, Tim Friehe
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文分析了具有参考依赖偏好的当事人审前议价行为。我们在Bebchuk(1984,“不完全信息下的诉讼和和解”,15 Rand Journal of Economics 404-15)的基础上,基于经验证据,假设参考是基于预期的。我们发现原告代表的参考依赖增加了和解的可能性。偏好依赖于参考的事实有意义地影响比较静力学的预测。在我们的扩展中,我们讨论了费用转移的作用,基于现状而不是基于预期的参考的影响,以及风险规避。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Settlement Negotiations with Reference-dependent Preferences
This article analyzes pretrial bargaining between litigants with reference-dependent preferences. We build on Bebchuk (1984, “Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information,” 15 Rand Journal of Economics 404–15) and, motivated by empirical evidence, assume that the referent is based on expectations. We find that reference dependence on behalf of plaintiffs increases the settlement probability. The fact that preferences are reference-dependent meaningfully influences comparative statics predictions. In our extensions, we discuss the role of fee shifting, the effect of having the referent based on the status quo instead of on expectations, and risk aversion.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
9
期刊介绍: The rise of the field of law and economics has been extremely rapid over the last 25 years. Among important developments of the 1990s has been the founding of the American Law and Economics Association. The creation and rapid expansion of the ALEA and the creation of parallel associations in Europe, Latin America, and Canada attest to the growing acceptance of the economic perspective on law by judges, practitioners, and policy-makers.
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