{"title":"这是构成标准形而上学的一个开放性问题","authors":"Yohan Molina","doi":"10.1111/phib.12295","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Jeremy Fix, in ‘Two Sorts of Constitutivism’ (2021), makes a case for the possibility of contingent essential properties to account for the metaphysical status of constitutive standards of things. In this brief note, I will present an open problem affecting Fix's conception, namely, the explanation of the membership of particulars to a genus, which is necessary to identify particulars subject to standards.","PeriodicalId":45646,"journal":{"name":"Analytic Philosophy","volume":"216 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"An open problem for the metaphysics of constitutive standards\",\"authors\":\"Yohan Molina\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/phib.12295\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract Jeremy Fix, in ‘Two Sorts of Constitutivism’ (2021), makes a case for the possibility of contingent essential properties to account for the metaphysical status of constitutive standards of things. In this brief note, I will present an open problem affecting Fix's conception, namely, the explanation of the membership of particulars to a genus, which is necessary to identify particulars subject to standards.\",\"PeriodicalId\":45646,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Analytic Philosophy\",\"volume\":\"216 3\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Analytic Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12295\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Analytic Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12295","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
An open problem for the metaphysics of constitutive standards
Abstract Jeremy Fix, in ‘Two Sorts of Constitutivism’ (2021), makes a case for the possibility of contingent essential properties to account for the metaphysical status of constitutive standards of things. In this brief note, I will present an open problem affecting Fix's conception, namely, the explanation of the membership of particulars to a genus, which is necessary to identify particulars subject to standards.
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