Francesco Giovanardi , Matthias Kaldorf , Lucas Radke , Florian Wicknig
{"title":"绿色债券的优惠待遇","authors":"Francesco Giovanardi , Matthias Kaldorf , Lucas Radke , Florian Wicknig","doi":"10.1016/j.red.2023.06.006","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>We study the preferential treatment of green bonds in the central bank collateral framework as a climate policy instrument within a </span>DSGE model<span> with climate and financial frictions. In the model, green and carbon-emitting conventional firms issue defaultable corporate bonds to banks that use them as collateral, subject to haircuts determined by the central bank. A haircut reduction induces firms to increase bond issuance, investment, leverage, and default risk. Collateral policy solves a trade-off between increasing collateral supply, adverse effects on firm risk-taking, and subsidizing green investment. Optimal collateral policy is characterized by a haircut gap of 20 percentage points, which increases the green investment share and reduces emissions. However, welfare gains fall well short of what can be achieved with optimal carbon taxes. Moreover, due to elevated risk-taking of green firms, preferential treatment is a qualitatively imperfect substitute of Pigouvian taxation on emissions: if and only if the optimal emission tax can not be implemented, optimal collateral policy features a preferential treatment of green bonds.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":47890,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Dynamics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The preferential treatment of green bonds\",\"authors\":\"Francesco Giovanardi , Matthias Kaldorf , Lucas Radke , Florian Wicknig\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.red.2023.06.006\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p><span>We study the preferential treatment of green bonds in the central bank collateral framework as a climate policy instrument within a </span>DSGE model<span> with climate and financial frictions. In the model, green and carbon-emitting conventional firms issue defaultable corporate bonds to banks that use them as collateral, subject to haircuts determined by the central bank. A haircut reduction induces firms to increase bond issuance, investment, leverage, and default risk. Collateral policy solves a trade-off between increasing collateral supply, adverse effects on firm risk-taking, and subsidizing green investment. Optimal collateral policy is characterized by a haircut gap of 20 percentage points, which increases the green investment share and reduces emissions. However, welfare gains fall well short of what can be achieved with optimal carbon taxes. Moreover, due to elevated risk-taking of green firms, preferential treatment is a qualitatively imperfect substitute of Pigouvian taxation on emissions: if and only if the optimal emission tax can not be implemented, optimal collateral policy features a preferential treatment of green bonds.</span></p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47890,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Review of Economic Dynamics\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Review of Economic Dynamics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S109420252300025X\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Review of Economic Dynamics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S109420252300025X","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the preferential treatment of green bonds in the central bank collateral framework as a climate policy instrument within a DSGE model with climate and financial frictions. In the model, green and carbon-emitting conventional firms issue defaultable corporate bonds to banks that use them as collateral, subject to haircuts determined by the central bank. A haircut reduction induces firms to increase bond issuance, investment, leverage, and default risk. Collateral policy solves a trade-off between increasing collateral supply, adverse effects on firm risk-taking, and subsidizing green investment. Optimal collateral policy is characterized by a haircut gap of 20 percentage points, which increases the green investment share and reduces emissions. However, welfare gains fall well short of what can be achieved with optimal carbon taxes. Moreover, due to elevated risk-taking of green firms, preferential treatment is a qualitatively imperfect substitute of Pigouvian taxation on emissions: if and only if the optimal emission tax can not be implemented, optimal collateral policy features a preferential treatment of green bonds.
期刊介绍：
Review of Economic Dynamics publishes meritorious original contributions to dynamic economics. The scope of the journal is intended to be broad and to reflect the view of the Society for Economic Dynamics that the field of economics is unified by the scientific approach to economics. We will publish contributions in any area of economics provided they meet the highest standards of scientific research.
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