{"title":"不完全信息匹配的稳定性理论","authors":"Yi-Chun Chen, Gaoji Hu","doi":"10.1257/mic.20200411","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We provide a framework for studying two-sided matching markets with incomplete information. The framework accommodates two-sided incomplete information as well as heterogeneous information among the agents. We propose a notion called stability for a market state, which, based upon agents’ information structure, requires (i) individual rationality, (ii) no blocking, and (iii) information stability. The novelty of our stability notion lies in how the agents evaluate a blocking prospect in the presence of general two-sided incomplete information. We show that a stable state exists; moreover, if a state is stable, then coarsening agents’ information leads to another stable state. (JEL C78, D83)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Theory of Stability in Matching with Incomplete Information\",\"authors\":\"Yi-Chun Chen, Gaoji Hu\",\"doi\":\"10.1257/mic.20200411\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We provide a framework for studying two-sided matching markets with incomplete information. The framework accommodates two-sided incomplete information as well as heterogeneous information among the agents. We propose a notion called stability for a market state, which, based upon agents’ information structure, requires (i) individual rationality, (ii) no blocking, and (iii) information stability. The novelty of our stability notion lies in how the agents evaluate a blocking prospect in the presence of general two-sided incomplete information. We show that a stable state exists; moreover, if a state is stable, then coarsening agents’ information leads to another stable state. (JEL C78, D83)\",\"PeriodicalId\":47467,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics\",\"volume\":\"5 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-02-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200411\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200411","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
A Theory of Stability in Matching with Incomplete Information
We provide a framework for studying two-sided matching markets with incomplete information. The framework accommodates two-sided incomplete information as well as heterogeneous information among the agents. We propose a notion called stability for a market state, which, based upon agents’ information structure, requires (i) individual rationality, (ii) no blocking, and (iii) information stability. The novelty of our stability notion lies in how the agents evaluate a blocking prospect in the presence of general two-sided incomplete information. We show that a stable state exists; moreover, if a state is stable, then coarsening agents’ information leads to another stable state. (JEL C78, D83)
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