Signalling in European Rule of Law Cases: Hungary and Poland as Case Studies

Abstract The paper explores Hungary and Poland’s compliance signals conveyed during the European rule of law enforcement process and the responses to these signals by the Court of Justice of the EU and the European Court of Human Rights as judicial organs and the European Commission and the Committee of Ministers as organs supervising compliance. After both states turned illiberal European institutions began condemning the condition of rule of law in both states. Yet, their endeavour—as evident from measures imposed upon Poland, but not Hungary—appears inconsistent. The paper ascribes this to states' differing expressions of commitment to comply with rule-of-law-related rulings as signalled during supervision. It argues that Hungary’s signalled conciliatory attitude compared to Poland’s overt defiance invites more deference from the European institutions and concludes that conveying conciliatory signals in the process of compliance may be used to influence the course and, ultimately, the success of rule of law enforcement.