Aidan Coville, Sebastian Galiani, Paul Gertler, Susumu Yoshida
{"title":"资助内罗毕非正式住区的市政供水和卫生服务","authors":"Aidan Coville, Sebastian Galiani, Paul Gertler, Susumu Yoshida","doi":"10.1162/rest_a_01379","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We test two ways to improve revenue collection efficiency for water and sanitation utilities: (i) face-to-face engagement between utility staff and customers and (ii) contract enforcement for service disconnection due to nonpayment in the form of transparent and credible disconnection notices. Engagement has no effect, while enforcement significantly increases payment. We find no effect on access to water, perceptions of the utility, relationships between tenants and property owners, or on tenant mental well-being nine months after the intervention. These results suggest that transparent contract enforcement was effective at improving revenue collection efficiency without incurring significant observed social or political costs.","PeriodicalId":275408,"journal":{"name":"The Review of Economics and Statistics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Financing Municipal Water and Sanitation Services in Nairobi's Informal Settlements\",\"authors\":\"Aidan Coville, Sebastian Galiani, Paul Gertler, Susumu Yoshida\",\"doi\":\"10.1162/rest_a_01379\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract We test two ways to improve revenue collection efficiency for water and sanitation utilities: (i) face-to-face engagement between utility staff and customers and (ii) contract enforcement for service disconnection due to nonpayment in the form of transparent and credible disconnection notices. Engagement has no effect, while enforcement significantly increases payment. We find no effect on access to water, perceptions of the utility, relationships between tenants and property owners, or on tenant mental well-being nine months after the intervention. These results suggest that transparent contract enforcement was effective at improving revenue collection efficiency without incurring significant observed social or political costs.\",\"PeriodicalId\":275408,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Review of Economics and Statistics\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Review of Economics and Statistics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01379\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Review of Economics and Statistics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01379","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Financing Municipal Water and Sanitation Services in Nairobi's Informal Settlements
Abstract We test two ways to improve revenue collection efficiency for water and sanitation utilities: (i) face-to-face engagement between utility staff and customers and (ii) contract enforcement for service disconnection due to nonpayment in the form of transparent and credible disconnection notices. Engagement has no effect, while enforcement significantly increases payment. We find no effect on access to water, perceptions of the utility, relationships between tenants and property owners, or on tenant mental well-being nine months after the intervention. These results suggest that transparent contract enforcement was effective at improving revenue collection efficiency without incurring significant observed social or political costs.