论证言怀疑论者的生活:证言怀疑主义能被摒弃吗?

IF 1.1 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2023-02-02 DOI:10.1093/pq/pqad003

Arnon Keren

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引用次数: 1

摘要

在当代证言认识论中，人们普遍认为，证言怀疑主义可以在不涉及支持该观点的可能原因或论据的情况下被驳回。这种可驳回性假设既构成了还原论和非还原论证词观点之间争论的基础，也导致了当代认识论中对证词怀疑主义的忽视。本文认为，即使给出了关于什么可以构成否定怀疑观点的有效依据的自由假设，证明怀疑主义是不可接受的假设也应该被拒绝。因为，即使我们所熟悉的怀疑立场和对证言证明的怀疑可以在这样的基础上被驳回，但对证言知识的怀疑却不能。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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ON LIVING THE TESTIMONIAL SCEPTIC’S LIFE: CAN TESTIMONIAL SCEPTICISM BE DISMISSED?

Abstract Within the contemporary epistemology of testimony, it is widely assumed that testimonial scepticism can be dismissed without engaging with possible reasons or arguments supporting the view. This assumption of dismissibility both underlies the debate between reductionist and non-reductionist views of testimony and is responsible for the neglect of testimonial scepticism within contemporary epistemology. This paper argues that even given liberal assumptions about what may constitute valid grounds for the dismissal of a sceptical view, the assumption that testimonial scepticism is dismissible should be rejected. For even if familiar sceptical positions and scepticism about testimonial justification can be dismissed on such grounds, scepticism about testimonial knowledge cannot.

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来源期刊

PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.70

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Philosophical Quarterly is one of the most highly regarded and established academic journals in philosophy. In an age of increasing specialism, it remains committed to publishing high-quality articles from leading international scholars across the range of philosophical study. Accessibility of its content for all philosophers - including students - is an editorial priority. The Philosophical Quarterly regularly publishes articles, discussions and reviews, and runs an annual Essay Prize. Its distinguished international contributors engage with both the established and the new, for example, through reflection on cognitive psychology, decision theory, quantum mechanics.