不可核查排放的相关自愿环境协定

IF 1.1 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Berardino Cesi, Alessio D’Amato
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引用次数: 0

摘要

环境监管和污染控制可能会与无法验证的任务(如特定源排放)发生冲突。为了解决这一问题,我们通过关系契约方法从动态角度重塑了现有文献中已有的自愿协议工具。我们在N家企业对称的背景下定义了关系自愿环境协议(RVEA),并表明即使企业之间的排放不具有可收缩性,因此执行不能委托给第三方,如果企业足够耐心,自我执行的RVEA也会促使环境目标的实现。最后,我们的福利分析揭示了一个显著的结果:我们的RVEA可以意味着更少的搭便车,并在第三方强制执行的自愿环境协议方面提高福利(沿着McEvoy, D. M.和J. K. Stranlund. 2010的路线)。“自愿环境协议的昂贵执行。”环境与资源经济[j];
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Relational Voluntary Environmental Agreements with Unverifiable Emissions
Abstract Environmental regulation and pollution control may clash against the presence of unverifiable tasks, like source-specific emissions. To tackle this issue, we reshape a voluntary agreement instrument, already available in the existing literature, from a dynamic perspective by means of a relational contracting approach. We define a Relational Voluntary Environmental Agreement (RVEA) in an N firms symmetric context, and show that even if emissions are not contractible across firms, and therefore enforcement cannot be delegated to a third party, if firms are sufficiently patient, a self-enforcing RVEA induces the achievement of the environmental objective. Finally, our welfare analysis reveals a notable result: our RVEA can imply less free riding and be welfare-improving with respect to a Voluntary Environmental Agreement enforced by a third party (along the lines of McEvoy, D. M., and J. K. Stranlund. 2010. “Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental Agreements.” Environmental and Resource Economics 47: 45–63).
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.50
自引率
11.10%
发文量
33
期刊介绍: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy welcomes submissions that employ microeconomics to analyze issues in business, consumer behavior, and public policy. We aim to be an international forum for scholarship, whether the scholarship considers an issue that is general or that pertains to a particular country or region, but authors should bear in mind that our readers come from around the world. Potential issues of interest include: the interaction of firms, the functioning of markets, the effects of domestic and international policy, and the design of organizations and institutions.
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