挑战核溴化物

IF 1.5 3区社会学 Q2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Survival Pub Date : 2023-09-03 DOI:10.1080/00396338.2023.2261247

Dallas Boyd

{"title":"挑战核溴化物","authors":"Dallas Boyd","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2261247","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"AbstractDespite the universal implications of nuclear weapons for humanity, broad knowledge of nuclear policy is curiously absent from the public sphere and even among many senior figures in government. Nuclear strategists have nourished the belief that the principles of nuclear deterrence are so esoteric as to exempt them from non-expert scrutiny, creating an intellectual vacuum within which a number of fallacies about nuclear strategy have taken root. These fallacies in turn find expression in the configuration of several states’ nuclear postures, from the number of warheads posited as necessary for deterrence to the selection of adversary targets. Puncturing the myth of complexity that surrounds nuclear policy is a necessary starting point to assess its more questionable features. This essay evaluates some of the prevailing tenets of nuclear strategy to expose for non-experts the many misconceptions that shape the major powers’ strategic postures.Key words: counterforcecountervaluedeterrenceintercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)launch-on-warningnuclear deterrencenuclear weaponspre-emptionsubmarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)‘use or lose’ AcknowledgementsThanks to James Acton, Rick Christensen, James Crabtree, John Maenchen, Jessica Mathews, Aaron Miles, Michael Molino, Joshua Pollack and Alex Wood for helpful comments.Notes1 Douglas Martin, ‘Roger C. Molander, Nuclear Protest Leader, Dies at 71’, New York Times, 31 March 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/01/us/roger-c-molander-dies-at-71-stirred-nuclear-protests.html.2 See Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Defense Science Board Task Force, ‘Nuclear Deterrence Skills’, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force, September 2008, https://dsb.cto.mil/reports/2000s/ADA487983.pdf.3 Ashley J. Tellis, ‘India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal’, RAND Corporation, MR-1127-AF, 2001, p. 19.4 Victor D. Cha, ‘How to Disarm a Nuclear North Korea’, Washington Post, 9 October 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-to-disarm-a-nuclear-north-korea/2011/10/09/gIQAlaZeYL_story.html.5 See Sheena Chestnut, ‘Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks’, International Security, vol. 32, no. 1, Summer 2007, pp. 80–111.6 ‘Bush: Don’t Wait for Mushroom Cloud’, CNN, 8 October 2002, https://edition.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/10/07/bush.transcript/; and White House, ‘Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Rutte at Opening Session of the Nuclear Security Summit’, 1 April 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/01/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-rutte-opening-session-nuclear.7 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2022: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2022), p. 342.8 Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1983), pp. 259–61.9 See Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, ‘Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 38, nos 1–2, 2015, pp. 38–73.10 Jeffrey A. Larsen et al., ‘Qualitative Considerations of Nuclear Forces at Lower Numbers and Implications for Future Arms Control Negotiations’, USAF Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper 68, July 2012, p. xiv, https://www.usafa.edu/app/uploads/OCP68.pdf.11 See Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, ‘Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945–2010’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1 July 2010, https://thebulletin.org/2010/07/global-nuclear-weapons-inventories-1945-2010/.12 George Perkovich, Do Unto Others: Toward a Defensible Nuclear Doctrine (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), p. 62.13 Matthew G. McKinzie et al., ‘The US Nuclear War Plan: A Time for Change’, Natural Resources Defense Council, June 2001, p. x, https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/us-nuclear-war-plan-report.pdf.14 T.C. Schelling, ‘The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack’, RAND Corporation, P-1342, 16 April 1958 (revised 28 May 1958), p. 3 (emphasis in original), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2007/P1342.pdf.15 Stephen J. Cimbala and James Scouras, A New Nuclear Century: Strategic Stability and Arms Control (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), pp. 2–3.16 See Brad Roberts, ‘Debating Nuclear No-first-use – Again’, Survival, vol. 61, no. 3, June–July 2019, pp. 39–56.17 While repudiating ‘launch-onwarning’, the United States acknowledges it ‘maintains the capability to launch nuclear forces under conditions of an ongoing nuclear attack’. However, the failure to clarify a substantive difference between the two options suggests the distinction is contrived. See US Department of Defense, ‘Report on the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States – 2020’, p. 6, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/NCB/21-F-0591_2020_Report_of_the_Nuclear_Employement_Strategy_of_the_United_States.pdf.18 Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2021’, Annual Report to Congress, p. 93, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF.19 Jeffrey Lewis, ‘Our Nuclear Procedures Are Crazier than Trump’, Foreign Policy, 5 August 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/05/our-nuclear-procedures-are-crazier-than-trump/.20 Nick Gass, ‘Former CIA Director Fears Trump “Crisis in Civil–Military Relationships”’, Politico, 3 August 2016, https://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/michael-hayden-trump-military-226606.21 See US Department of Defense, ‘Nuclear Employment Strategy’, p. 6.22 David Wright, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the Myth of the “Re-alerting Race”’, Equation, 6 September 2016, https://blog.ucsusa.org/david-wright/nuclear-weapons-re-alerting-race/.23 James E. Doyle, ‘You’re NUTS: New Nuclear Cruise Missiles Are Inherently Destabilizing’, National Interest, 30 November 2015, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/youre-nuts-new-nuclear-cruise-missiles-are-inherently-14457.24 See, for example, Michael Mandelbaum, ‘How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb: The Case for Deterrence’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 94, no. 6, November/December 2015, pp. 19–24.25 See Gerald F. Seib, ‘Amid Signs of a Thaw in North Korea, Tensions Bubble Up’, Wall Street Journal, 9 January 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/amid-signs-of-a-thaw-in-north-korea-tensions-bubble-up-1515427541.26 Van Jackson, ‘Want to Strike North Korea? It’s Not Going to Go the Way You Think’, Politico, 12 January 2018, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/12/north-korea-strike-nuclear-strategist-216306/.27 Jina Kim and John K. Warden, ‘Limiting North Korea’s Coercive Nuclear Leverage’, Survival, vol. 62, no. 1, February–March 2020, pp. 31–8.28 Christopher F. Chyba and J.D. Crouch, ‘Understanding the US Nuclear Weapons Policy Debate’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 3, July 2009, pp. 21–36 (emphasis added).29 The figure is from Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda and Eliana Reynolds, ‘Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Weapons, 2023’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 9 May 2023, https://thebulletin.org/premium/2023-05/nuclear-notebook-russian-nuclear-weapons-2023/.30 See Jan Lodal, ‘The Counterforce Fantasy’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 89, no. 2, March/April 2010, pp. 145–6.31 National Research Council, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism (Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2002), p. 40.32 See Hui Zhang, ‘China’s Fissile Material Production and Stockpile’, International Panel on Fissile Materials, Research Report No. 17, 2017, https://fissilematerials.org/library/rr17.pdf.33 Jeffrey Lewis, ‘Do We Need ICBMs?’, Arms Control Wonk, 19 July 2012, https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/205519/do-we-need-icbms/ (emphasis in original).34 Eleanor Chelimsky, ‘The U.S. Nuclear Triad: GAO’s Evaluation of the Strategic Modernization Program’, General Accounting Office testi-mony before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 10 June 1993, p. 6, https://www.gao.gov/assets/t-pemd-93-5.pdf.35 Lewis, ‘Do We Need ICBMs?’36 Dave Majumdar, ‘$348 Billion in Nukes Ain’t Enough. The Air Force Wants New ICBMs, Too’, Daily Beast, 28 January 2015, https://www.thedailybeast.com/dollar348-billion-in-nukes-aint-enough-the-air-force-wants-new-icbms-too.37 See ‘Transcript: National Defense Industrial Association, Air Force Association and Reserve Officers Association Capitol Hill Breakfast Forum with Linton Brooks’, Peter Huessy Congressional Breakfast Seminar Series, 28 June 2012, https://secure.afa.org/HBS/transcripts/2012/6-28-2012%20Linton%20Brooks.pdf.38 ‘Rep. Adam Smith on US Nuclear Policy’, Ploughshares Fund, 24 October 2019, https://ploughshares.org/issues-analysis/article/rep-adam-smith-us-nuclear-policy.39 Richard Rhodes, Arsenals of Folly: The Making of the Nuclear Arms Race (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), p. 187.40 See Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, ‘“The Cold War Was Truly Over” – The 1986 Reykjavik Summit’, 27 September 2016, https://adst.org/2016/09/the-cold-war-truly-over-1986-reykjavik-summit/.41 Fred Kaplan, ‘We Don’t Need a Better Nuclear Arsenal to Take on China’, Slate, 23 April 2021, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/04/nuclear-triad-overhaul-china.html.42 See Ronald Reagan, ‘Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security’, 23 March 1983, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-nation-defense-and-national-security.43 For a nuanced view, see Harold A. Feiveson (ed.), The Nuclear Turning Point: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and De-alerting of Nuclear Weapons (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999).44 Upton Sinclair, I, Candidate for Governor, and How I Got Licked (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1935), p. 109.Additional informationNotes on contributorsDallas BoydDallas Boyd is a policy analyst with experience in nuclear-weapons policy, nuclear counter-terrorism policy and deterrence theory. The views reflected here are the author’s personal views and should not be attributed to any institution with which he is or has been affiliated.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Challenging Nuclear Bromides\",\"authors\":\"Dallas Boyd\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/00396338.2023.2261247\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"AbstractDespite the universal implications of nuclear weapons for humanity, broad knowledge of nuclear policy is curiously absent from the public sphere and even among many senior figures in government. Nuclear strategists have nourished the belief that the principles of nuclear deterrence are so esoteric as to exempt them from non-expert scrutiny, creating an intellectual vacuum within which a number of fallacies about nuclear strategy have taken root. These fallacies in turn find expression in the configuration of several states’ nuclear postures, from the number of warheads posited as necessary for deterrence to the selection of adversary targets. Puncturing the myth of complexity that surrounds nuclear policy is a necessary starting point to assess its more questionable features. This essay evaluates some of the prevailing tenets of nuclear strategy to expose for non-experts the many misconceptions that shape the major powers’ strategic postures.Key words: counterforcecountervaluedeterrenceintercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)launch-on-warningnuclear deterrencenuclear weaponspre-emptionsubmarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)‘use or lose’ AcknowledgementsThanks to James Acton, Rick Christensen, James Crabtree, John Maenchen, Jessica Mathews, Aaron Miles, Michael Molino, Joshua Pollack and Alex Wood for helpful comments.Notes1 Douglas Martin, ‘Roger C. Molander, Nuclear Protest Leader, Dies at 71’, New York Times, 31 March 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/01/us/roger-c-molander-dies-at-71-stirred-nuclear-protests.html.2 See Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Defense Science Board Task Force, ‘Nuclear Deterrence Skills’, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force, September 2008, https://dsb.cto.mil/reports/2000s/ADA487983.pdf.3 Ashley J. Tellis, ‘India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal’, RAND Corporation, MR-1127-AF, 2001, p. 19.4 Victor D. Cha, ‘How to Disarm a Nuclear North Korea’, Washington Post, 9 October 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-to-disarm-a-nuclear-north-korea/2011/10/09/gIQAlaZeYL_story.html.5 See Sheena Chestnut, ‘Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks’, International Security, vol. 32, no. 1, Summer 2007, pp. 80–111.6 ‘Bush: Don’t Wait for Mushroom Cloud’, CNN, 8 October 2002, https://edition.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/10/07/bush.transcript/; and White House, ‘Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Rutte at Opening Session of the Nuclear Security Summit’, 1 April 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/01/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-rutte-opening-session-nuclear.7 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2022: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2022), p. 342.8 Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1983), pp. 259–61.9 See Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, ‘Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 38, nos 1–2, 2015, pp. 38–73.10 Jeffrey A. Larsen et al., ‘Qualitative Considerations of Nuclear Forces at Lower Numbers and Implications for Future Arms Control Negotiations’, USAF Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper 68, July 2012, p. xiv, https://www.usafa.edu/app/uploads/OCP68.pdf.11 See Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, ‘Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945–2010’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1 July 2010, https://thebulletin.org/2010/07/global-nuclear-weapons-inventories-1945-2010/.12 George Perkovich, Do Unto Others: Toward a Defensible Nuclear Doctrine (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), p. 62.13 Matthew G. McKinzie et al., ‘The US Nuclear War Plan: A Time for Change’, Natural Resources Defense Council, June 2001, p. x, https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/us-nuclear-war-plan-report.pdf.14 T.C. Schelling, ‘The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack’, RAND Corporation, P-1342, 16 April 1958 (revised 28 May 1958), p. 3 (emphasis in original), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2007/P1342.pdf.15 Stephen J. Cimbala and James Scouras, A New Nuclear Century: Strategic Stability and Arms Control (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), pp. 2–3.16 See Brad Roberts, ‘Debating Nuclear No-first-use – Again’, Survival, vol. 61, no. 3, June–July 2019, pp. 39–56.17 While repudiating ‘launch-onwarning’, the United States acknowledges it ‘maintains the capability to launch nuclear forces under conditions of an ongoing nuclear attack’. However, the failure to clarify a substantive difference between the two options suggests the distinction is contrived. See US Department of Defense, ‘Report on the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States – 2020’, p. 6, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/NCB/21-F-0591_2020_Report_of_the_Nuclear_Employement_Strategy_of_the_United_States.pdf.18 Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2021’, Annual Report to Congress, p. 93, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF.19 Jeffrey Lewis, ‘Our Nuclear Procedures Are Crazier than Trump’, Foreign Policy, 5 August 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/05/our-nuclear-procedures-are-crazier-than-trump/.20 Nick Gass, ‘Former CIA Director Fears Trump “Crisis in Civil–Military Relationships”’, Politico, 3 August 2016, https://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/michael-hayden-trump-military-226606.21 See US Department of Defense, ‘Nuclear Employment Strategy’, p. 6.22 David Wright, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the Myth of the “Re-alerting Race”’, Equation, 6 September 2016, https://blog.ucsusa.org/david-wright/nuclear-weapons-re-alerting-race/.23 James E. Doyle, ‘You’re NUTS: New Nuclear Cruise Missiles Are Inherently Destabilizing’, National Interest, 30 November 2015, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/youre-nuts-new-nuclear-cruise-missiles-are-inherently-14457.24 See, for example, Michael Mandelbaum, ‘How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb: The Case for Deterrence’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 94, no. 6, November/December 2015, pp. 19–24.25 See Gerald F. Seib, ‘Amid Signs of a Thaw in North Korea, Tensions Bubble Up’, Wall Street Journal, 9 January 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/amid-signs-of-a-thaw-in-north-korea-tensions-bubble-up-1515427541.26 Van Jackson, ‘Want to Strike North Korea? It’s Not Going to Go the Way You Think’, Politico, 12 January 2018, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/12/north-korea-strike-nuclear-strategist-216306/.27 Jina Kim and John K. Warden, ‘Limiting North Korea’s Coercive Nuclear Leverage’, Survival, vol. 62, no. 1, February–March 2020, pp. 31–8.28 Christopher F. Chyba and J.D. Crouch, ‘Understanding the US Nuclear Weapons Policy Debate’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 3, July 2009, pp. 21–36 (emphasis added).29 The figure is from Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda and Eliana Reynolds, ‘Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Weapons, 2023’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 9 May 2023, https://thebulletin.org/premium/2023-05/nuclear-notebook-russian-nuclear-weapons-2023/.30 See Jan Lodal, ‘The Counterforce Fantasy’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 89, no. 2, March/April 2010, pp. 145–6.31 National Research Council, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism (Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2002), p. 40.32 See Hui Zhang, ‘China’s Fissile Material Production and Stockpile’, International Panel on Fissile Materials, Research Report No. 17, 2017, https://fissilematerials.org/library/rr17.pdf.33 Jeffrey Lewis, ‘Do We Need ICBMs?’, Arms Control Wonk, 19 July 2012, https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/205519/do-we-need-icbms/ (emphasis in original).34 Eleanor Chelimsky, ‘The U.S. Nuclear Triad: GAO’s Evaluation of the Strategic Modernization Program’, General Accounting Office testi-mony before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 10 June 1993, p. 6, https://www.gao.gov/assets/t-pemd-93-5.pdf.35 Lewis, ‘Do We Need ICBMs?’36 Dave Majumdar, ‘$348 Billion in Nukes Ain’t Enough. The Air Force Wants New ICBMs, Too’, Daily Beast, 28 January 2015, https://www.thedailybeast.com/dollar348-billion-in-nukes-aint-enough-the-air-force-wants-new-icbms-too.37 See ‘Transcript: National Defense Industrial Association, Air Force Association and Reserve Officers Association Capitol Hill Breakfast Forum with Linton Brooks’, Peter Huessy Congressional Breakfast Seminar Series, 28 June 2012, https://secure.afa.org/HBS/transcripts/2012/6-28-2012%20Linton%20Brooks.pdf.38 ‘Rep. Adam Smith on US Nuclear Policy’, Ploughshares Fund, 24 October 2019, https://ploughshares.org/issues-analysis/article/rep-adam-smith-us-nuclear-policy.39 Richard Rhodes, Arsenals of Folly: The Making of the Nuclear Arms Race (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), p. 187.40 See Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, ‘“The Cold War Was Truly Over” – The 1986 Reykjavik Summit’, 27 September 2016, https://adst.org/2016/09/the-cold-war-truly-over-1986-reykjavik-summit/.41 Fred Kaplan, ‘We Don’t Need a Better Nuclear Arsenal to Take on China’, Slate, 23 April 2021, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/04/nuclear-triad-overhaul-china.html.42 See Ronald Reagan, ‘Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security’, 23 March 1983, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-nation-defense-and-national-security.43 For a nuanced view, see Harold A. Feiveson (ed.), The Nuclear Turning Point: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and De-alerting of Nuclear Weapons (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999).44 Upton Sinclair, I, Candidate for Governor, and How I Got Licked (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1935), p. 109.Additional informationNotes on contributorsDallas BoydDallas Boyd is a policy analyst with experience in nuclear-weapons policy, nuclear counter-terrorism policy and deterrence theory. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要尽管核武器对人类有着普遍的影响，但奇怪的是，在公共领域，甚至在政府的许多高级官员中，都缺乏对核政策的广泛了解。核战略家们一直认为，核威慑原则是如此深奥，以至于可以免于非专业人士的审查，从而造成了一个知识真空，在这个真空中，一些关于核战略的谬论扎根了。这些谬论反过来又体现在几个国家的核态势配置中，从为威慑所必需的核弹头数量到对手目标的选择。戳穿围绕核政策的复杂神话，是评估其更多可疑特征的必要起点。本文评估了一些流行的核战略原则，为非专家揭示了塑造大国战略姿态的许多误解。关键词:反作用力反价值威慑洲际弹道导弹(icbm)预警发射核威慑核武器先发制人潜射弹道导弹(slbm)“使用或失去”致谢感谢James Acton, Rick Christensen, James Crabtree, John Maenchen, Jessica Mathews, Aaron Miles, Michael Molino, Joshua Pollack和Alex Wood的有用评论。注1 Douglas Martin，“Roger C. Molander，核抗议领袖，享年71岁”，《纽约时报》，2012年3月31日，https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/01/us/roger-c-molander-dies-at-71-stirred-nuclear-protests.html.2见美国国防部负责采办、技术和后勤的副部长办公室，国防科学委员会工作组，“核威慑技能”，国防科学委员会工作组报告，2008年9月，https://dsb.cto.mil/reports/2000s/ADA487983.pdf.3 Ashley J. Tellis，“印度正在形成的核态势:在潜伏的威慑力量和准备好的武库之间”，兰德公司，2001年，第19.4页。Victor D. Cha，“如何解除拥有核武器的朝鲜的武装”，华盛顿邮报，2011年10月9日，https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-to-disarm-a-nuclear-north-korea/2011/10/09/gIQAlaZeYL_story.html.5见Sheena Chestnut，“非法活动和扩散:朝鲜走私网络”，《国际安全》，第32卷，第19页。1、2007年夏季，第80-111.6页“布什:不要等待蘑菇云”，CNN, 2002年10月8日，https://edition.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/10/07/bush.transcript/;和白宫，“奥巴马总统和首相Rutte在核安全峰会开幕式上的讲话”，2016年4月1日，https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/01/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-rutte-opening-session-nuclear.7斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所，SIPRI年鉴2022:军备，裁军和国际安全(斯德哥尔摩:SIPRI, 2022)，第342.8页。斯坦福大学出版社，1983)，第259-61.9页。见Austin Long和Brendan Rittenhouse Green，“跟踪安全的第二次打击:情报、反作用力和核战略”，《战略研究杂志》，第38卷，第1-2期，2015年，第38 - 73.10页Jeffrey A. Larsen等人，“较低数量核力量的定性考虑及其对未来军备控制谈判的影响”，美国空军国家安全研究所，2012年7月，第68页，第xiv页，https://www.usafa.edu/app/uploads/OCP68.pdf.11见Robert S. Norris和Hans M. Kristensen，“1945-2010年全球核武器清单”。《原子科学家公告》，2010年7月1日，https://thebulletin.org/2010/07/global-nuclear-weapons-inventories-1945-2010/.12 George Perkovich，《对他人的行为:走向可防御的核主义》(华盛顿特区:卡内基国际和平基金会，2013)，第62.13页，Matthew G. McKinzie等人，《美国核战争计划:“变革的时刻”，自然资源保护委员会，2001年6月，第x页，https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/us-nuclear-war-plan-report.pdf.14 T.C.谢林，“对突袭的相互恐惧”，兰德公司，p -1342, 1958年4月16日(1958年5月28日修订)，第3页(强调原文)，https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2007/P1342.pdf.15斯蒂芬·j·辛巴拉和詹姆斯·斯库拉斯，一个新的核世纪:战略稳定和军备控制(西波特，康涅狄格州):Praeger, 2002)，第2-3.16页。见Brad Roberts，“再次辩论不首先使用核武器”，《生存》，61卷，第61期。在拒绝“预警后发射”的同时，美国承认它“在持续的核攻击条件下保持发射核力量的能力”。然而，未能澄清这两种选择之间的实质性区别表明，这种区别是人为的。参见美国国防部，《2020年美国核就业战略报告》，第6页，https://www.esd.whs。毫升/门户/ 54 /文件/副长石/阅读% 20的房间/ NCB / 21 - f - 0591 _2020_report_of_the_nuclear_employement_strategy_of_the_united_states.pdf.18国防部长办公室，“2021年涉及中华人民共和国的军事和安全发展”，国会年度报告，第93页，https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF.19杰弗里·刘易斯，“我们的核程序比特朗普更疯狂”，外交政策，2016年8月5日，https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/05/our-nuclear-procedures-are-crazier-than-trump/.20尼克·加斯，“前中央情报局局长担心特朗普“军民关系危机””，Politico, 2016年8月3日，https://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/michael-hayden-trump-military-226606.21见美国国防部，“核就业战略”，第6.22页，David Wright，“核武器和“重新警报种族”的神话”，等式，2016年9月6日，https://blog.ucsusa.org/david-wright/nuclear-weapons-re-alerting-race/.23 James E. Doyle，“你疯了:新的核巡航导弹本质上是不稳定的”，国家利益，2015年11月30日，https://nationalinterest.org/feature/youre-nuts-new-nuclear-cruise-missiles-are-inherently-14457.24见，例如，迈克尔·曼德尔鲍姆，“如何防止伊朗炸弹:威慑的案例”，外交事务，第94卷，第94号。6, 2015年11月/ 12月，第19-24.25页，见Gerald F. Seib，“在朝鲜解冻的迹象中，紧张的泡沫”，华尔街日报，2018年1月9日，https://www.wsj.com/articles/amid-signs-of-a-thaw-in-north-korea-tensions-bubble-up-1515427541.26 Van Jackson，“想打击朝鲜吗?它不会像你想的那样”，政治，2018年1月12日，https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/12/north-korea-strike-nuclear-strategist-216306/.27吉娜·金和约翰·k·沃登，“限制朝鲜的强制性核杠杆”，生存，第62卷，no。Christopher F. Chyba和J.D. Crouch，“理解美国核武器政策辩论”，华盛顿季刊，第32卷，第31-8.28号。第3期，2009年7月，第21-36页这一数字来自汉斯·m·克里斯滕森、马特·科尔达和埃莉安娜·雷诺兹，《核笔记本:2023年俄罗斯核武器》，《原子科学家公报》，2023年5月9日，https://thebulletin.org/premium/2023-05/nuclear-notebook-russian-nuclear-weapons-2023/.30见Jan Lodal，《反作用力幻想》，《外交事务》，第89卷，第89期。美国国家研究委员会，《使国家更安全:科学和技术在反恐中的作用》(华盛顿特区:国家科学院出版社，2002年)，第40.32页。见张辉，“中国的裂变材料生产和储存”，国际裂变材料小组，2017年第17期研究报告，https://fissilematerials.org/library/rr17.pdf.33杰弗里·刘易斯，“我们需要洲际弹道导弹吗?”，《军备控制工作》，2012年7月19日，https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/205519/do-we-need-icbms/(重点为原文)Eleanor Chelimsky，“美国核三位一体:政府问责局对战略现代化项目的评估”，美国参议院政府事务委员会前总会计办公室的证词，1993年6月10日，第6页，https://www.gao.gov/assets/t-pemd-93-5.pdf.35 Lewis，“我们需要洲际弹道导弹吗?”戴夫·马宗达，3480亿美元的核武器还不够。空军也想要新的洲际弹道导弹”，《每日野兽》，2015年1月28日，https://www.thedailybeast.com/dollar348-billion-in-nukes-aint-enough-the-air-force-wants-new-icbms-too.37参见“文字记录:国防工业协会、空军协会和预备役军官协会与林顿·布鲁克斯的国会山早餐论坛”，彼得·赫西国会早餐研讨会系列，2012年6月28日，https://secure.afa.org/HBS/transcripts/2012/6-28-2012%20Linton%20Brooks.pdf.38”《亚当·斯密谈美国核政策》，犁头基金，2019年10月24日，https://ploughshares.org/issues-analysis/article/rep-adam-smith-us-nuclear-policy.39理查德·罗兹，《愚蠢的军火库:核军备竞赛的形成》(纽约:Knopf出版2007),p。187.40看到外交协会的研究和训练,”“冷战是真正结束”——1986年雷克雅未克峰会”,2016年9月27日,https://adst.org/2016/09/the -冷-战争-真正的-在- 1986雷克雅未克summit/.41弗雷德·卡普兰,“我们不需要一个更好的核武库承担中国,板岩,2021年4月23日,https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/04/nuclear-triad-overhaul-china.html.42看到罗纳德·里根,美国国防和国家安全的地址的,1983年3月23日，https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-nation-defense-and-national-security.43一个细致的观点，见Harold a . Feiveson(编)，核转折点:一个蓝图的深度削减和解除核武器(华盛顿特区:布鲁金斯学会出版社，1999年)厄普顿·辛克莱:《我，州长候选人和我是如何被打败的》(纽约:Farrar & Rinehart出版社，1935)，第109页。附加信息投稿人说明达拉斯·博伊德达拉斯·博伊德是一名政策分析师，在核武器政策、核恐怖主义政策和威慑理论方面拥有丰富经验。这里反映的观点是作者的个人观点，不应归因于他所隶属或曾经隶属的任何机构。

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Challenging Nuclear Bromides

AbstractDespite the universal implications of nuclear weapons for humanity, broad knowledge of nuclear policy is curiously absent from the public sphere and even among many senior figures in government. Nuclear strategists have nourished the belief that the principles of nuclear deterrence are so esoteric as to exempt them from non-expert scrutiny, creating an intellectual vacuum within which a number of fallacies about nuclear strategy have taken root. These fallacies in turn find expression in the configuration of several states’ nuclear postures, from the number of warheads posited as necessary for deterrence to the selection of adversary targets. Puncturing the myth of complexity that surrounds nuclear policy is a necessary starting point to assess its more questionable features. This essay evaluates some of the prevailing tenets of nuclear strategy to expose for non-experts the many misconceptions that shape the major powers’ strategic postures.Key words: counterforcecountervaluedeterrenceintercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)launch-on-warningnuclear deterrencenuclear weaponspre-emptionsubmarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)‘use or lose’ AcknowledgementsThanks to James Acton, Rick Christensen, James Crabtree, John Maenchen, Jessica Mathews, Aaron Miles, Michael Molino, Joshua Pollack and Alex Wood for helpful comments.Notes1 Douglas Martin, ‘Roger C. Molander, Nuclear Protest Leader, Dies at 71’, New York Times, 31 March 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/01/us/roger-c-molander-dies-at-71-stirred-nuclear-protests.html.2 See Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Defense Science Board Task Force, ‘Nuclear Deterrence Skills’, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force, September 2008, https://dsb.cto.mil/reports/2000s/ADA487983.pdf.3 Ashley J. Tellis, ‘India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal’, RAND Corporation, MR-1127-AF, 2001, p. 19.4 Victor D. Cha, ‘How to Disarm a Nuclear North Korea’, Washington Post, 9 October 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-to-disarm-a-nuclear-north-korea/2011/10/09/gIQAlaZeYL_story.html.5 See Sheena Chestnut, ‘Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks’, International Security, vol. 32, no. 1, Summer 2007, pp. 80–111.6 ‘Bush: Don’t Wait for Mushroom Cloud’, CNN, 8 October 2002, https://edition.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/10/07/bush.transcript/; and White House, ‘Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Rutte at Opening Session of the Nuclear Security Summit’, 1 April 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/01/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-rutte-opening-session-nuclear.7 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2022: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2022), p. 342.8 Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1983), pp. 259–61.9 See Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, ‘Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 38, nos 1–2, 2015, pp. 38–73.10 Jeffrey A. Larsen et al., ‘Qualitative Considerations of Nuclear Forces at Lower Numbers and Implications for Future Arms Control Negotiations’, USAF Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper 68, July 2012, p. xiv, https://www.usafa.edu/app/uploads/OCP68.pdf.11 See Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, ‘Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945–2010’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1 July 2010, https://thebulletin.org/2010/07/global-nuclear-weapons-inventories-1945-2010/.12 George Perkovich, Do Unto Others: Toward a Defensible Nuclear Doctrine (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), p. 62.13 Matthew G. McKinzie et al., ‘The US Nuclear War Plan: A Time for Change’, Natural Resources Defense Council, June 2001, p. x, https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/us-nuclear-war-plan-report.pdf.14 T.C. Schelling, ‘The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack’, RAND Corporation, P-1342, 16 April 1958 (revised 28 May 1958), p. 3 (emphasis in original), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2007/P1342.pdf.15 Stephen J. Cimbala and James Scouras, A New Nuclear Century: Strategic Stability and Arms Control (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), pp. 2–3.16 See Brad Roberts, ‘Debating Nuclear No-first-use – Again’, Survival, vol. 61, no. 3, June–July 2019, pp. 39–56.17 While repudiating ‘launch-onwarning’, the United States acknowledges it ‘maintains the capability to launch nuclear forces under conditions of an ongoing nuclear attack’. However, the failure to clarify a substantive difference between the two options suggests the distinction is contrived. See US Department of Defense, ‘Report on the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States – 2020’, p. 6, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/NCB/21-F-0591_2020_Report_of_the_Nuclear_Employement_Strategy_of_the_United_States.pdf.18 Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2021’, Annual Report to Congress, p. 93, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF.19 Jeffrey Lewis, ‘Our Nuclear Procedures Are Crazier than Trump’, Foreign Policy, 5 August 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/05/our-nuclear-procedures-are-crazier-than-trump/.20 Nick Gass, ‘Former CIA Director Fears Trump “Crisis in Civil–Military Relationships”’, Politico, 3 August 2016, https://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/michael-hayden-trump-military-226606.21 See US Department of Defense, ‘Nuclear Employment Strategy’, p. 6.22 David Wright, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the Myth of the “Re-alerting Race”’, Equation, 6 September 2016, https://blog.ucsusa.org/david-wright/nuclear-weapons-re-alerting-race/.23 James E. Doyle, ‘You’re NUTS: New Nuclear Cruise Missiles Are Inherently Destabilizing’, National Interest, 30 November 2015, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/youre-nuts-new-nuclear-cruise-missiles-are-inherently-14457.24 See, for example, Michael Mandelbaum, ‘How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb: The Case for Deterrence’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 94, no. 6, November/December 2015, pp. 19–24.25 See Gerald F. Seib, ‘Amid Signs of a Thaw in North Korea, Tensions Bubble Up’, Wall Street Journal, 9 January 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/amid-signs-of-a-thaw-in-north-korea-tensions-bubble-up-1515427541.26 Van Jackson, ‘Want to Strike North Korea? It’s Not Going to Go the Way You Think’, Politico, 12 January 2018, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/12/north-korea-strike-nuclear-strategist-216306/.27 Jina Kim and John K. Warden, ‘Limiting North Korea’s Coercive Nuclear Leverage’, Survival, vol. 62, no. 1, February–March 2020, pp. 31–8.28 Christopher F. Chyba and J.D. Crouch, ‘Understanding the US Nuclear Weapons Policy Debate’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 3, July 2009, pp. 21–36 (emphasis added).29 The figure is from Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda and Eliana Reynolds, ‘Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Weapons, 2023’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 9 May 2023, https://thebulletin.org/premium/2023-05/nuclear-notebook-russian-nuclear-weapons-2023/.30 See Jan Lodal, ‘The Counterforce Fantasy’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 89, no. 2, March/April 2010, pp. 145–6.31 National Research Council, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism (Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2002), p. 40.32 See Hui Zhang, ‘China’s Fissile Material Production and Stockpile’, International Panel on Fissile Materials, Research Report No. 17, 2017, https://fissilematerials.org/library/rr17.pdf.33 Jeffrey Lewis, ‘Do We Need ICBMs?’, Arms Control Wonk, 19 July 2012, https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/205519/do-we-need-icbms/ (emphasis in original).34 Eleanor Chelimsky, ‘The U.S. Nuclear Triad: GAO’s Evaluation of the Strategic Modernization Program’, General Accounting Office testi-mony before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 10 June 1993, p. 6, https://www.gao.gov/assets/t-pemd-93-5.pdf.35 Lewis, ‘Do We Need ICBMs?’36 Dave Majumdar, ‘$348 Billion in Nukes Ain’t Enough. The Air Force Wants New ICBMs, Too’, Daily Beast, 28 January 2015, https://www.thedailybeast.com/dollar348-billion-in-nukes-aint-enough-the-air-force-wants-new-icbms-too.37 See ‘Transcript: National Defense Industrial Association, Air Force Association and Reserve Officers Association Capitol Hill Breakfast Forum with Linton Brooks’, Peter Huessy Congressional Breakfast Seminar Series, 28 June 2012, https://secure.afa.org/HBS/transcripts/2012/6-28-2012%20Linton%20Brooks.pdf.38 ‘Rep. Adam Smith on US Nuclear Policy’, Ploughshares Fund, 24 October 2019, https://ploughshares.org/issues-analysis/article/rep-adam-smith-us-nuclear-policy.39 Richard Rhodes, Arsenals of Folly: The Making of the Nuclear Arms Race (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), p. 187.40 See Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, ‘“The Cold War Was Truly Over” – The 1986 Reykjavik Summit’, 27 September 2016, https://adst.org/2016/09/the-cold-war-truly-over-1986-reykjavik-summit/.41 Fred Kaplan, ‘We Don’t Need a Better Nuclear Arsenal to Take on China’, Slate, 23 April 2021, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/04/nuclear-triad-overhaul-china.html.42 See Ronald Reagan, ‘Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security’, 23 March 1983, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-nation-defense-and-national-security.43 For a nuanced view, see Harold A. Feiveson (ed.), The Nuclear Turning Point: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and De-alerting of Nuclear Weapons (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999).44 Upton Sinclair, I, Candidate for Governor, and How I Got Licked (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1935), p. 109.Additional informationNotes on contributorsDallas BoydDallas Boyd is a policy analyst with experience in nuclear-weapons policy, nuclear counter-terrorism policy and deterrence theory. The views reflected here are the author’s personal views and should not be attributed to any institution with which he is or has been affiliated.

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来源期刊

Survival Multiple-

CiteScore

2.10

自引率

16.70%

发文量

期刊介绍： Survival, the Institute"s bi-monthly journal, is a leading forum for analysis and debate of international and strategic affairs. With a diverse range of authors, thoughtful reviews and review essays, Survival is scholarly in depth while vivid, well-written and policy-relevant in approach. Shaped by its editors to be both timely and forward-thinking, the journal encourages writers to challenge conventional wisdom and bring fresh, often controversial, perspectives to bear on the strategic issues of the moment. Survival is essential reading for practitioners, analysts, teachers and followers of international affairs. Each issue also contains Book Reviews of the most important recent publications on international politics and security.