弱总替代需求下市场均衡的拍卖算法

IF 1.1 Q4 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2023-09-14 DOI:10.1145/3624558

Jugal Garg, Edin Husić, László A. Végh

{"title":"弱总替代需求下市场均衡的拍卖算法","authors":"Jugal Garg, Edin Husić, László A. Végh","doi":"10.1145/3624558","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We consider the Arrow–Debreu exchange market model under the assumption that the agents’ demands satisfy the weak gross substitutes (WGS) property. We present a simple auction algorithm that obtains an approximate market equilibrium for WGS demands assuming the availability of a price update oracle. We exhibit specific implementations of such an oracle for WGS demands with bounded price elasticities and for Gale demand systems.","PeriodicalId":42216,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"An Auction Algorithm for Market Equilibrium with Weak Gross Substitute Demands\",\"authors\":\"Jugal Garg, Edin Husić, László A. Végh\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/3624558\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We consider the Arrow–Debreu exchange market model under the assumption that the agents’ demands satisfy the weak gross substitutes (WGS) property. We present a simple auction algorithm that obtains an approximate market equilibrium for WGS demands assuming the availability of a price update oracle. We exhibit specific implementations of such an oracle for WGS demands with bounded price elasticities and for Gale demand systems.\",\"PeriodicalId\":42216,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-09-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3624558\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3624558","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

摘要

我们在假设代理人的需求满足弱总替代(WGS)性质的前提下考虑Arrow-Debreu交易市场模型。我们提出了一个简单的拍卖算法，该算法可以获得WGS需求的近似市场均衡，假设价格更新oracle可用性。我们展示了具有有限价格弹性的WGS需求和Gale需求系统的这种oracle的具体实现。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

An Auction Algorithm for Market Equilibrium with Weak Gross Substitute Demands

We consider the Arrow–Debreu exchange market model under the assumption that the agents’ demands satisfy the weak gross substitutes (WGS) property. We present a simple auction algorithm that obtains an approximate market equilibrium for WGS demands assuming the availability of a price update oracle. We exhibit specific implementations of such an oracle for WGS demands with bounded price elasticities and for Gale demand systems.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS-

CiteScore

3.80

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation welcomes submissions of the highest quality that concern the intersection of computer science and economics. Of interest to the journal is any topic relevant to both economists and computer scientists, including but not limited to the following: Agents in networks Algorithmic game theory Computation of equilibria Computational social choice Cost of strategic behavior and cost of decentralization ("price of anarchy") Design and analysis of electronic markets Economics of computational advertising Electronic commerce Learning in games and markets Mechanism design Paid search auctions Privacy Recommendation / reputation / trust systems Systems resilient against malicious agents.