相对论坍缩理论的本体

Quantum Worlds Pub Date : 2018-05-01 DOI:10.1017/9781108562218.003

W. Myrvold

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引用次数: 6

摘要

如果某种动力坍缩理论是正确的，世界会是什么样子?这样的理论可以是量子态一元论吗，或者这样的理论必须用额外的能量来补充量子态本体论吗?在之前的一篇文章(Myrvold 2018)中，我为量子态一元论辩护，采用了Philip Pearle倡导的分布式本体论。在这一章中，叙述扩展到相对论时空中的坍缩理论。

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Ontology for Relativistic Collapse Theories

If some sort of dynamical collapse theory is correct, what might the world be like? Can a theory of that sort be a quantum state monist theory, or must such theories supplement the quantum state ontology with additional beables? In a previous work (Myrvold 2018), I defended quantum state monism, with a distributional ontology along the lines advocated by Philip Pearle. In this chapter the account is extended to collapse theories in relativistic spacetimes.

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Quantum Worlds

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