柏拉图《斐多篇》中的前世,死后的生命和非时间存在

C. Rowett
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我认为柏拉图《斐多篇》中的对话在两个层面上进行,并诉诸于两种不同的不朽概念,一种是暂时的(死后或出生前的持续生命),另一种是暂时的(不受死亡、时间和所有连续事件的影响)。苏格拉底和他的朋友们关心的是灵魂是否会在今生之后继续存在,以及它是否在出生前就存在。虽然这看起来像是对暂时生存的关注,但我认为,作为作者,柏拉图正在确定另一种不朽,只适用于灵魂,作为时间之外的存在,“之前”和“之后”并不适用。通过研究灵魂对死亡的免疫(在许多意义上的“死亡”)和它与生命的联系(在一种意义上的“生命”)究竟意味着什么,我考虑了灵魂在什么意义上可以有一种类似于形式的非时间存在,并研究了一些关于这样一个存在如何与一系列身体一起进入时间体验的难题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Pre-Existence, Life after Death, and Atemporal Beings in Plato’s Phaedo
I argue that the conversation in Plato’s Phaedo operates on two levels, and appeals to two different notions of immortality, one temporal (continuing life after death or before birth) and one atemporal (immunity from death, time and all sequential events). Socrates and his friends are concerned about whether the soul will survive beyond the present life, and whether it existed prior to birth. While this looks like a concern about temporal survival, I argue that Plato, as author, is identifying another kind of immortality, proper to the soul alone, as a being outside time, to which “before” and “after” do not apply. By examining exactly what is meant by its immunity to death (in a number of senses of ‘death’) and its association with life (in one sense of ‘life’), I consider in what sense the soul could have a kind of atemporal being akin to that which pertains to the Forms, and examine some puzzles about how such a being could enter into temporal experience in conjunction with a sequence of bodies.
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