Conflicts of the soul and mind-body interaction in Descartes’s Passions of the Soul

n the following paper, I aim to provide a clear account of Descartes’ explanation of akratic behaviour in his Passions of the Soul.1 The analysis of Descartes’ arguments will give me the occasion to remark on some aspects, which I regard as seminal for the understanding of his controversial theory of mind-body interaction through the pineal gland.2 In particular, I will focus on Descartes’ insights into his theory of the “Natural Institution” and the role of the body as the effective place where the “conflicts of the soul” are determined to occur. In the first section I will briefly recall the Platonic theory of the partitioning of the soul, presenting it—in agreement with a long interpretive tradition—as Plato’s answer to the philosophical problem of akratic behaviour. In the second, I will introduce Descartes’ arguments in favour of the unity