金融中的委托代理问题

Sunit N. Shah
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引用次数: 14

摘要

委托人与代表委托人行事的代理人之间的关系包含潜在的利益冲突。当这种关系涉及不一致的激励和信息不对称时,就会出现委托代理问题。在资产管理中,导致委托代理问题的因素包括管理者的薪酬结构和投资者关注短期业绩的倾向。在银行业,无数的委托代理关系和复杂的工具为激励冲突提供了肥沃的土壤,其中许多在最近的金融危机中得到了突出体现。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Principal - Agent Problem in Finance
The relationship between a principal and the agent who acts on the principal’s behalf contains the potential for conflicts of interest. The principal–agent problem arises when this relationship involves both misaligned incentives and information asymmetry. In asset management, factors contributing to the principal–agent problem include managers’ compensation structures and investors’ tendency to focus on short-term performance. In the banking industry, myriad principal–agent relationships and complex instruments provide a fertile breeding ground for incentive conflicts, many of which were highlighted by the recent financial crisis.
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