社会规范与合作

PSN: Game Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-02-05 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2735759

Bryan C. McCannon

{"title":"社会规范与合作","authors":"Bryan C. McCannon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2735759","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"A theoretical framework is introduced to model social norms using the tools of psychological game theory. In the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, a preference for norm compliance can lead to cooperation arising with a positive probability, and if this preference is sufficiently strong, occurring as a pure strategy equilibrium. Thus, cooperation can arise as a social norm in a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma Game without repeated play, communication, or sanctions.","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Social Norms and Cooperation\",\"authors\":\"Bryan C. McCannon\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2735759\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"A theoretical framework is introduced to model social norms using the tools of psychological game theory. In the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, a preference for norm compliance can lead to cooperation arising with a positive probability, and if this preference is sufficiently strong, occurring as a pure strategy equilibrium. Thus, cooperation can arise as a social norm in a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma Game without repeated play, communication, or sanctions.\",\"PeriodicalId\":373527,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"17 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-02-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"6\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2735759\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2735759","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 6

摘要

本文介绍了运用心理博弈论工具对社会规范进行建模的理论框架。在囚徒困境博弈中，对规范遵从的偏好可以导致以正概率出现的合作，如果这种偏好足够强，就会以纯策略均衡的形式出现。因此，在没有重复游戏、交流或制裁的一次性囚徒困境游戏中，合作可以作为一种社会规范出现。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Social Norms and Cooperation

A theoretical framework is introduced to model social norms using the tools of psychological game theory. In the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, a preference for norm compliance can lead to cooperation arising with a positive probability, and if this preference is sufficiently strong, occurring as a pure strategy equilibrium. Thus, cooperation can arise as a social norm in a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma Game without repeated play, communication, or sanctions.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

PSN: Game Theory (Topic)

自引率

0.00%

发文量