具有最大最小偏好的多对多匹配

PSN: Game Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-01-17 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.1986748

J. Hatfield, F. Kojima, Yusuke Narita

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引用次数: 19

摘要

我们考虑了在严格的偏好域限制下的多对多双边匹配问题，称为最大最小准则。我们证明，即使在这种限制下，对于市场一侧的代理来说，也不存在弱帕累托有效、策略证明或单调(即尊重改进)的稳定机制。这些结果特别暗示Baiou和Balinski(2000)的三个主要结果是不正确的。我们还表明，Baiou和Balinski(2007)的一个结果也是不正确的。

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Many-to-Many Matching with Max-Min Preferences

We consider the many-to-many two-sided matching problem under a stringent domain restriction on preferences called the max-min criterion. We show that, even under this restriction, there is no stable mechanism that is weakly Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, or monotonic (i.e., respects improvements) for agents on one side of the market. These results imply in particular that three of the main results of Baiou and Balinski (2000) are incorrect. We also show that one of the results of Baiou and Balinski (2007) is incorrect as well.

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PSN: Game Theory (Topic)

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