垂直协议和用户访问

Germain Gaudin, A. White
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引用次数: 8

摘要

作为生产者销售渠道的平台通常通过订阅费或硬件加价向用户收取访问费用。我们比较了平台与卖家使用的两种常见的垂直定价协议:按单位收费和按比例收费。特别是,我们分析了用户访问在两种协议形式下对价格、利润和福利所起的关键作用。我们描述了这一角色,并展示了它如何潜在地推翻标准结果,称比例费用导致更低的价格和更高的利润。(jel d21, d43, k21, l42, l86)
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Vertical Agreements and User Access
Platforms acting as sales channels for producers often charge users for access via a subscription fee or a markup on hardware. We compare two common forms of vertical pricing agreement that platforms use with sellers: per unit and proportional fees. In particular, we analyze the critical role that user access plays on prices, profits, and welfare under both forms of agreement. We characterize this role and show how it potentially overturns standard results saying that proportional fees lead to lower prices and higher profits. (JEL D21, D43, K21, L42, L86)
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