{"title":"表象问题","authors":"R. Cohen, J. Renn, K. Gavroglu","doi":"10.4324/9780203032510-4","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The object of this chapter is the idea that the origin of empirical underdetermination lies with our conceptual representation of the facts. By moving from simple to more sophisticated and radical proposals I aim to show that conventionalism(s), fictionalism, etc. are unsatisfactory responses to the problems posed by underdetermination.","PeriodicalId":132689,"journal":{"name":"Boston studies in the philosophy of science","volume":"261 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Problems of Representation\",\"authors\":\"R. Cohen, J. Renn, K. Gavroglu\",\"doi\":\"10.4324/9780203032510-4\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The object of this chapter is the idea that the origin of empirical underdetermination lies with our conceptual representation of the facts. By moving from simple to more sophisticated and radical proposals I aim to show that conventionalism(s), fictionalism, etc. are unsatisfactory responses to the problems posed by underdetermination.\",\"PeriodicalId\":132689,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Boston studies in the philosophy of science\",\"volume\":\"261 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"6\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Boston studies in the philosophy of science\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203032510-4\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Boston studies in the philosophy of science","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203032510-4","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The object of this chapter is the idea that the origin of empirical underdetermination lies with our conceptual representation of the facts. By moving from simple to more sophisticated and radical proposals I aim to show that conventionalism(s), fictionalism, etc. are unsatisfactory responses to the problems posed by underdetermination.
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