发现的可信度

J. Simon-Kerr
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引用次数: 0

摘要

证据法的规划在许多方面类似于作者或艺术家的规划。所有人都在寻求揭示更深层次的真相。虽然小说家可以自由地虚构人物和相应的行为,但证据法使用虚构的手段从表面上无法想象的事实中重建连贯的叙述。在某种程度上,它是通过构建我们评估证人可信度的方式来做到这一点的。证人所说的是大多数审判的核心,是否相信这些证人是一个首要问题。小说家或画家可以通过一个无所不知的叙述者或一个泄密的脸红向我们展示人物的内心生活。证据法采用了一种不同的,但同样令人回味的方式来表明可信度。它使原本不相关的信息在审判中成为可信的证据,鼓励事实调查员通过挖掘当事人的过去来考虑他们被要求接受的是什么样的人。在承认这一证据时,法律依赖于谎言倾向和针对是否应该相信证人的问题而量身定制的证据之间的错误等同,而证人是实际提供给事实查明者的证据。本章试图理清这两个概念——说谎倾向和信仰价值——并以此揭示错误的危险,即错误地使用价值和基于地位的区别来为法庭的叙述涂上色彩,以服务于超理性的证明过程。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Uncovering Credibility
The project of evidence law is in many ways analogous to that of the author or artist. All seek to expose deeper truths. While the novelist can freely invent character and corresponding behavior, evidence law uses fictive devices to recreate a coherent narrative from ostensibly unimagined facts. It does this, in part, by structuring the ways in which we assess witness credibility. What witnesses say is at the heart of most trials and whether to believe those witnesses is an overarching concern. The novelist or painter can show us the inner life of characters through an omniscient narrator or a telltale blush. Evidence law employs a different, though no less evocative, means for signaling credibility. It makes otherwise irrelevant information admissible at trial as credibility evidence, encouraging fact-finders to consider the kind of person whose word they are being asked to accept by digging into that person’s past. In admitting this evidence, the law relies on a false equivalence between a propensity to lie, which will allegedly be uncovered through credibility evidence, and evidence tailored to the question of whether a witness should be believed, which is what is actually being offered to the fact-finder. This chapter seeks to disentangle the two concepts—propensity to lie and worthiness of belief—and in so doing to reveal the danger in mistaking a fundamentally authorial impulse to use worthiness and status-based distinctions to color in the narratives of the courtroom in service of a hyper-rational process of proof.
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