{"title":"遥远的陌生人和站在波利萨里奥","authors":"A. Ganesh","doi":"10.5771/9783845299051-625","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Rules of procedure, such as those concerning standing to bring suit, lie at the very heart of what it means to be a legal subject empowered with rights. This contribution demonstrates this in the context of the recent Polisario cases before the EU courts, the latest instalment in the decades-long legal struggle over the Western Sahara between Morocco and the national liberation movement known as the Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía-elHamra y Río de Oro (Front Polisario).1 In particular, it considers the ways in which the various courts of the EU interpreted the rules of EU law on standing to bring judicial review, with a view to assessing whether it is true that the EU legal order offers all possible claimants a “complete system of remedies”.2 It concludes that this claim is untrue, and that a gap presents itself where the EU enters into a treaty with another entity with sovereign powers (‘state’ , for convenience) which disposes of the territory, natural resources, and consequently also people of a third state. We term such people ‘distant strangers’ because they are neither citizens of EU Member States nor are they present on Member State territory. Both the third state and its people have valid grievances against the EU. Nevertheless, they are barred from seeking appropriate judicial review of EU acts. The first item of interest is the December 2015 judgment of the General Court of the European Union (General Court), which partially annulled a I.","PeriodicalId":259556,"journal":{"name":"International Law and Litigation","volume":"52 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Distant Strangers and Standing in Polisario\",\"authors\":\"A. Ganesh\",\"doi\":\"10.5771/9783845299051-625\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Rules of procedure, such as those concerning standing to bring suit, lie at the very heart of what it means to be a legal subject empowered with rights. This contribution demonstrates this in the context of the recent Polisario cases before the EU courts, the latest instalment in the decades-long legal struggle over the Western Sahara between Morocco and the national liberation movement known as the Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía-elHamra y Río de Oro (Front Polisario).1 In particular, it considers the ways in which the various courts of the EU interpreted the rules of EU law on standing to bring judicial review, with a view to assessing whether it is true that the EU legal order offers all possible claimants a “complete system of remedies”.2 It concludes that this claim is untrue, and that a gap presents itself where the EU enters into a treaty with another entity with sovereign powers (‘state’ , for convenience) which disposes of the territory, natural resources, and consequently also people of a third state. We term such people ‘distant strangers’ because they are neither citizens of EU Member States nor are they present on Member State territory. Both the third state and its people have valid grievances against the EU. Nevertheless, they are barred from seeking appropriate judicial review of EU acts. The first item of interest is the December 2015 judgment of the General Court of the European Union (General Court), which partially annulled a I.\",\"PeriodicalId\":259556,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Law and Litigation\",\"volume\":\"52 3 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Law and Litigation\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299051-625\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Law and Litigation","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299051-625","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
程序规则,例如关于诉讼资格的规则,是被赋予权利的法律主体的核心。这一贡献在最近欧盟法院审理的波利萨里奥阵线案件的背景下证明了这一点,这是摩洛哥与民族解放运动Liberación de Saguía-elHamra y Río de Oro(波利萨里奥阵线)之间长达数十年的西撒哈拉法律斗争的最新部分特别是,它考虑了欧盟各法院解释欧盟法律规则的方式,以进行司法审查,以评估欧盟法律秩序是否真的为所有可能的索赔人提供了“完整的补救制度”它的结论是,这种说法是不真实的,当欧盟与另一个拥有主权权力的实体(“国家”,为方便起见)签订条约时,鸿沟就出现了,这个条约处理了第三国的领土、自然资源,因此也处理了第三国的人民。我们称这些人为“遥远的陌生人”,因为他们既不是欧盟成员国的公民,也不在欧盟成员国的领土上。第三国及其人民对欧盟都有正当的不满。然而,他们被禁止寻求对欧盟行为进行适当的司法审查。第一个感兴趣的项目是2015年12月欧盟普通法院(General Court of European Union)的判决,该判决部分废除了一项I。
Rules of procedure, such as those concerning standing to bring suit, lie at the very heart of what it means to be a legal subject empowered with rights. This contribution demonstrates this in the context of the recent Polisario cases before the EU courts, the latest instalment in the decades-long legal struggle over the Western Sahara between Morocco and the national liberation movement known as the Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía-elHamra y Río de Oro (Front Polisario).1 In particular, it considers the ways in which the various courts of the EU interpreted the rules of EU law on standing to bring judicial review, with a view to assessing whether it is true that the EU legal order offers all possible claimants a “complete system of remedies”.2 It concludes that this claim is untrue, and that a gap presents itself where the EU enters into a treaty with another entity with sovereign powers (‘state’ , for convenience) which disposes of the territory, natural resources, and consequently also people of a third state. We term such people ‘distant strangers’ because they are neither citizens of EU Member States nor are they present on Member State territory. Both the third state and its people have valid grievances against the EU. Nevertheless, they are barred from seeking appropriate judicial review of EU acts. The first item of interest is the December 2015 judgment of the General Court of the European Union (General Court), which partially annulled a I.