{"title":"扩散的游戏","authors":"Evan Sadler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2624865","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Behaviors and information often spread via person-to-person diffusion. This paper highlights how diffusion processes can facilitate coordination. I study contagion in a discrete network with Bayesian players. In addition to characterizing the extent and rate of adoption, we uncover a new effect: when large cascades are possible in equilibrium, exposure conveys information about a player’s network position. This effect underscores a novel trade-off in the design of marketing campaigns, suggesting conditions under which word-of-mouth is relatively more effective. A generalization of the model to multi-type networks suggests a new approach to targeted seeding. (JEL D83, D85, M31, M37, Z13)","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"29","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Diffusion Games\",\"authors\":\"Evan Sadler\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2624865\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Behaviors and information often spread via person-to-person diffusion. This paper highlights how diffusion processes can facilitate coordination. I study contagion in a discrete network with Bayesian players. In addition to characterizing the extent and rate of adoption, we uncover a new effect: when large cascades are possible in equilibrium, exposure conveys information about a player’s network position. This effect underscores a novel trade-off in the design of marketing campaigns, suggesting conditions under which word-of-mouth is relatively more effective. A generalization of the model to multi-type networks suggests a new approach to targeted seeding. (JEL D83, D85, M31, M37, Z13)\",\"PeriodicalId\":393761,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-07-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"29\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2624865\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2624865","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Behaviors and information often spread via person-to-person diffusion. This paper highlights how diffusion processes can facilitate coordination. I study contagion in a discrete network with Bayesian players. In addition to characterizing the extent and rate of adoption, we uncover a new effect: when large cascades are possible in equilibrium, exposure conveys information about a player’s network position. This effect underscores a novel trade-off in the design of marketing campaigns, suggesting conditions under which word-of-mouth is relatively more effective. A generalization of the model to multi-type networks suggests a new approach to targeted seeding. (JEL D83, D85, M31, M37, Z13)