好的监控,坏的监控

Yaniv Grinstein, Stefano Rossi
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引用次数: 11

摘要

法院是公司决策的有效监督者吗?在一起具有里程碑意义的争议案件中,特拉华州最高法院裁定董事个人应对违反受托责任负责,这标志着特拉华州对公司决策的审查力度大幅加强。在我们的事件研究中,在三天的事件窗口中,低增长的特拉华州公司的表现比匹配的非特拉华州公司高出1%。相比之下,特拉华州的高增长公司表现落后1%。与之前的文献相反,我们得出的结论是,法院判决可以对公司价值产生巨大、显著和异质性的影响,并且使董事免受法院审查的规则有利于经济增长最快的部门。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Good Monitoring, Bad Monitoring
Are courts effective monitors of corporate decisions? In a controversial landmark case, the Delaware Supreme Court held directors personally liable for breaching their fiduciary duties, signaling a sharp increase in Delaware’s scrutiny over corporate decisions. In our event study, low-growth Delaware firms outperformed matched non-Delaware firms by 1% in the three day event window. In contrast, high-growth Delaware firms under-performed by 1%. Contrary to previous literature, we conclude that court decisions can have large, significant and heterogeneous effects on firm value, and that rules insulating directors from court scrutiny benefit the fastest growing sectors of the economy.
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