垂直兼并:垂直整合和不愿从竞争对手那里购买

D. Heavner
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引用次数: 15

摘要

垂直整合会减少整合企业的贸易机会,而且与两家企业模型的预测相反,这种贸易损失会使整合无利可图。如果下游单位在签订最终贸易条款之前必须向供应商承诺,那么供应商将具有事后垄断权力。这种垄断力量降低了集成供应商向其竞争对手提供的质量。对这种质量降低的预期会阻止企业从一体化供应商那里采购,即使供应商如果能够承诺为其下游竞争对手提供足够的质量以保持其业务,情况会更好。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Vertical Enclosure: Vertical Integration and the Reluctance to Purchase from a Competitor
Vertical integration can reduce integrating firms' trading opportunities and, contrary to predictions of two-firm models, this loss of trade can make integration unprofitable. If downstream units must commit to suppliers before contracting on the final terms of trade, then suppliers will have ex-post monopoly power. This monopoly power reduces the quality that an integrated supplier will provide to its competitors. Expectations of this quality reduction can prevent firms from purchasing from an integrated supplier even though the supplier would be better off if it could commit to provide its downstream competitors with sufficient quality to retain their business.
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