包含空洞名称的真理

M. Mckinsey
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引用次数: 1

摘要

1. 一个直接参考的问题。根据直接指称命题(简称DR-thesis),包含自然语言专有名称和指示代词的句子所表达的命题是名称和指示物的语义指称物的严格功能,而不是名称和指示物可能声称拥有的任何Fregean描述性意义或内容的功能。另一种表达这种观点的方式是,专有名称或索引对包含该术语的句子所表达的命题的唯一语义贡献是该术语的语义指称。伯特兰·罗素称这类术语为“逻辑意义上的名称”(1988,201)。我称它们为“真正的术语”。按照标准惯例,我将把包含真词的句子所表达的命题称为“单一命题”。和其他许多人一样,我支持博士论文。就我而言,支持这一论点的主要原因在于John Searle(1958)首先简要介绍的情态考虑,后来被Saul Kripke (1972a)澄清并有力地应用,这些考虑表明专有名称不具有偶然确定描述的意义。David Kaplan(1989)提出了相关观点来支持索引代词也是真正的术语的结论。在最近的工作中,我详细地论证了DR-thesis需要(a)一个包含非指称名称或索引的句子不能表达任何命题,因此(b)这样的句子不能有真值,也就是说,既不能为真也不能为假。(见麦肯锡2006和(手稿)。)按照Braun(1993)的观点,我们可以称(a)为“无命题”观点。显然,无命题观点是直接从博士论文中衍生出来的。毕竟,如果一个包含真项的句子所表达的命题是该项所指物的函数,而该项又没有所指物,那么这个句子就不能表达任何命题:没有参数的函数就没有价值。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Truths Containing Empty Names
1. A problem for direct reference. According to the thesis of Direct Reference (or the DR-thesis for short), the propositions expressed by sentences containing the proper names and indexical pronouns of natural language are a strict function of the semantic referents of the names and indexicals, as opposed to being a function of any Fregean descriptive senses or contents that the names and indexicals might be alleged to possess. Another way of expressing this idea is to say that the sole semantic contribution that a proper name or indexical can make to the propositions expressed by sentences containing the term is the term’s semantic referent. Bertrand Russell called terms of this sort ‘names in the logical sense’ (1918, 201). I will call them ‘genuine terms’. Following standard practice, I will call the propositions expressed by sentences containing genuine terms, ‘singular propositions’. Like many others, I endorse the DR-thesis. In my case, the primary reason for endorsing the thesis lies in the modal considerations first briefly introduced by John Searle (1958) and later clarified and forcefully applied by Saul Kripke (1972a), considerations which show that proper names do not have the meanings of contingent definite descriptions. David Kaplan (1989) raised related points to support the conclusion that indexical pronouns are also genuine terms. In recent work I have argued at some length that the DR-thesis entails both that (a) a sentence containing a non-referring name or indexical can express no proposition, and hence that (b) such sentences can have no truth value, that is, can be neither true or false. (See McKinsey 2006 and (manuscript).) Following Braun (1993), we can call (a) the ‘noproposition’ view. It certainly seems that the no-proposition view follows immediately from the DR-thesis. After all, if the proposition expressed by a sentence containing a genuine term is a function of the term’s referent, and yet the term has no referent, then the sentence can express no proposition: a function without an argument can have no value.
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