多门槛公共产品游戏的焦点:单个项目的元分析

Corazzini Luca, Matteo M. Marini
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引用次数: 10

摘要

本文对四个实验进行了单项目荟萃分析,首先将慈善捐赠作为个人对多种竞争门槛公共产品的贡献进行了建模。鉴于随着受助人数量的增加而出现的协调困境的中心地位,我们在个人层面汇集了15,936个观察结果,目的是确定最有效的焦点、它们的机制以及它们对捐助者财富的影响。我们发现,公共产品之间的竞争意味着大量的协调问题,这些问题源于较少的贡献和较低的利润。在这种情况下,最有力的协调手段是存在一种突出其优点的单一捐款选择。我们还观察到成功提供公共产品的倒u型趋势,为经验作为多重公共产品框架特有的焦点提供了证据。有效的协调人不会利用更大的贡献来解决协调困境,但他们会产生更高的收益。最后,授权证明是减少不协调风险的一种健全手段,只要代表在形式上有义务将转让的资源中足够高的百分比传递下去。我们讨论了我们的发现可能带来的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Focal points in multiple threshold public goods games: A single-project meta-analysis
This paper is a single-project meta-analysis of four experiments that first model charitable giving as individual contributions to a multiplicity of competing threshold public goods. Given the centrality of the coordination dilemma as the number of recipients increases, we pool 15,936 observations at the individual level for the purpose of identifying the most effective focal points, their mechanics, and their implications for donors’ wealth. We find that competition between public goods implies massive coordination problems that originate from fewer contributions and result in lower profits. In this setting, the most powerful coordination device turns out to be the existence of a single contribution option that stands out on its merits. We also observe an inverted U-shaped trend in the successful provision of public goods, offering evidence for experience as a focal point peculiar to the multiple-public-good framework. The effective focal points do not leverage greater contributions to solve the coordination dilemma, yet they generate higher earnings. Finally, delegation proves to be a sound device for reducing the risk of miscoordination as long as the delegate is formally obliged to pass along a high enough percentage of the transferred resources. We discuss possible implications of our findings.
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