反思学生手机搜索

M. McAllister
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This article examines Riley’s impact on searches of K-12 and college students’ cell phones as an incident to a violation of law or school rule, the school setting’s analog to Riley. As of today, Riley requires probable cause and a warrant to search a cell phone’s digital contents as an incident to an ordinary arrest. However, neither of these safeguards is required to conduct the same search as an incident to a K-12 student’s suspected violation of law or school policy. Thus, Riley and K-12 precedents are in tension, particularly in those instances where K-12 students are arrested on school grounds in possession of a cell phone. The law is somewhat less clear in regards to college student cell phone searches. However, courts have recognized reduced Fourth Amendment protections there as well. After weighing the pros and cons of extending Riley to the schoolhouse gates, this article arrives at the simple conclusion that, despite its narrow holding, Riley’s sweeping pronouncements regarding the unique privacy concerns inherent in the modern cell phone demand a rethinking of the law governing student cell phone searches. Riley stated, for example, that the privacy protections owed modern cell phones are even greater than what we enjoy in our homes, the area that has traditionally received the greatest Fourth Amendment protection, thereby implying that cell phone searches, of any kind and in any place, are owed the greatest possible constitutional protection. In addition, although Riley involved searches of arrestees, who have traditionally enjoyed diminished privacy interests, the Court nevertheless found the privacy-related concerns in cell phones weighty enough to require a warrant, notwithstanding arrestees’ reduced expectations of privacy. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

根据第四修正案的分析,搜查刑事犯罪证据通常需要搜查令。但是,根据搜查令要求的从事件到逮捕的例外情况,一旦一个人被拘留逮捕,就可以自动进行某些无搜查令的搜查,例如搜查可能在被捕者可及范围内的武器或可销毁证据。只要逮捕本身是合法的,对武器和可销毁证据的搜查就不需要独立的怀疑。在莱利诉加州案中,美国最高法院一致驳回了将搜查事件扩展到逮捕例外适用于手机的提议,从而要求搜查手机数字内容时要有搜查令,尽管对被捕者的隐私保护在其他方面有所减少。这篇文章研究了莱利对K-12和大学生手机搜索的影响,作为违反法律或学校规则的事件,学校设置类似于莱利。从今天开始,莱利需要合理的理由和搜查令才能搜查手机的数字内容就像普通逮捕一样。然而,这些保障措施都不需要对K-12学生涉嫌违反法律或学校政策的事件进行同样的搜查。因此,莱利案和K-12的判例关系紧张,特别是在K-12学生在校园内携带手机被捕的情况下。法律在大学生手机搜查方面没有那么明确。然而,法院也承认第四修正案的保护力度有所减弱。在权衡利弊之后,本文得出了一个简单的结论,即尽管它的观点狭隘,莱利关于现代手机固有的独特隐私问题的全面声明要求重新思考管理学生手机搜查的法律。莱利举例说,现代手机对隐私的保护甚至比我们在家里享受的隐私更大,而我们在家里的隐私传统上受到第四修正案的最大保护,这意味着,在任何地方进行任何形式的手机搜查,都应受到宪法的最大保护。此外,虽然莱利案涉及到对被捕者的搜查,而被捕者的隐私权益历来较少,但法院仍然认为,尽管被捕者对隐私的期望降低,但与手机有关的隐私问题严重到足以需要搜查令。这个确切的理由也适用于K-12和大学生,他们和被捕者一样,也享有较少的第四修正案保护。本文最后建议加强第四修正案对K-12和大学手机搜查的保护。首先,这篇文章认为,尽管大学生在某些情况下对隐私的期望降低了,特别是在校园安全问题占主导地位的行政检查中,但这种裁决的理由并不适用于手机的数字内容。很简单,手机的数字数据,不像藏在宿舍里的武器,不会伤害任何人,而且定期检查这些设备也不会改善教育环境。因此,这篇文章认为,大学生应该得到与莱利案中成年被告同样的手机保护,即获得搜查令和合理理由的充分保护。对于K-12学生,本文提倡一种中间解决方案,既考虑到适用于所有手机的独特隐私利益,又保留了控制K-12学习环境的需要,而不受不当的司法监督。因此,本文建议K-12学校采用一种内部制衡制度,包括对学校官员搜查学生手机的愿望进行更高级别的独立审查,以及监督官员在进行搜查之前必须签署的行政许可。我希望你发现这篇文章达到了它的预期目的,根据莱利诉加州案仔细反思学生手机搜索。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Rethinking Student Cell Phone Searches
In Fourth Amendment analysis, warrants are ordinarily required to search for evidence of criminal wrongdoing. However, under the warrant requirement’s search-incident-to-arrest exception, once an individual has been placed under custodial arrest, certain warrantless searches may automatically follow, such as a search for weapons or destructible evidence potentially within the arrestee’s reach. As long as the arrest itself is lawful, the resulting search for weapons and destructible evidence requires no independent suspicion. In Riley v. California, the United States Supreme Court unanimously rejected the proposed extension of the search incident to arrest exception to cell phones, thereby requiring a warrant to search a cell phone’s digital contents notwithstanding the otherwise reduced privacy protections afforded arrestees. This article examines Riley’s impact on searches of K-12 and college students’ cell phones as an incident to a violation of law or school rule, the school setting’s analog to Riley. As of today, Riley requires probable cause and a warrant to search a cell phone’s digital contents as an incident to an ordinary arrest. However, neither of these safeguards is required to conduct the same search as an incident to a K-12 student’s suspected violation of law or school policy. Thus, Riley and K-12 precedents are in tension, particularly in those instances where K-12 students are arrested on school grounds in possession of a cell phone. The law is somewhat less clear in regards to college student cell phone searches. However, courts have recognized reduced Fourth Amendment protections there as well. After weighing the pros and cons of extending Riley to the schoolhouse gates, this article arrives at the simple conclusion that, despite its narrow holding, Riley’s sweeping pronouncements regarding the unique privacy concerns inherent in the modern cell phone demand a rethinking of the law governing student cell phone searches. Riley stated, for example, that the privacy protections owed modern cell phones are even greater than what we enjoy in our homes, the area that has traditionally received the greatest Fourth Amendment protection, thereby implying that cell phone searches, of any kind and in any place, are owed the greatest possible constitutional protection. In addition, although Riley involved searches of arrestees, who have traditionally enjoyed diminished privacy interests, the Court nevertheless found the privacy-related concerns in cell phones weighty enough to require a warrant, notwithstanding arrestees’ reduced expectations of privacy. This exact rationale can be applied to K-12 and college students, who, like arrestees, have also enjoyed reduced Fourth Amendment protections. This article concludes by proposing heightened Fourth Amendment protections for both K-12 and college cell phone searches. First, this article argues that although college students enjoy reduced expectations of privacy in certain instances, particularly for administrative inspections where campus safety concerns predominate, the justifications for such rulings do not apply to a cell phone’s digital contents. Quite simply, a cell phone’s digital data, unlike a weapon hidden in a dorm room, cannot harm anyone, and routinely inspecting such devices would not enhance the educational environment. Thus, this article contends that college students deserve the same protections in their cell phones enjoyed by the adult defendants in Riley, namely, the full protections of a warrant and probable cause. For K-12 students, this article advocates a middle-ground solution that accounts for the unique privacy interests that apply to all cell phones while preserving the need to control the K-12 learning environment without undue judicial supervision. This article thus proposes that K-12 schools adopt an internal system of checks and balances consisting of a higher-level, independent review of a school official’s desire to search a student cell phone, along with an administrative warrant the supervising official must sign before the search may be carried out. I hope you find this article achieves its intended purpose of carefully rethinking student cell phone searches in light of Riley v. California.
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