Jeremy I. Bulow, P. Klemperer, Stanford GSB Submitter
{"title":"误诊银行资本问题","authors":"Jeremy I. Bulow, P. Klemperer, Stanford GSB Submitter","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3915917","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Banks' reluctance to repair their balance sheets, combined with deposit insurance and regulatory forbearance in recognizing greater risks and losses, can lead to solvency problems that look like liquidity (bank-run) crises. Regulatory forbearance incentivizes banks to both retain risky loans and reject new good opportunities. With sufficient regulatory forbearance, partially-insured banks act exactly as if they are fully insured. Stress tests certify that uninsured creditors will be paid, not solvency, and have ambiguous effects on the efficiency of investment.","PeriodicalId":145273,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Economics: Central Banks - Policies & Impacts eJournal","volume":"219 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Misdiagnosing Bank Capital Problems\",\"authors\":\"Jeremy I. Bulow, P. Klemperer, Stanford GSB Submitter\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3915917\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Banks' reluctance to repair their balance sheets, combined with deposit insurance and regulatory forbearance in recognizing greater risks and losses, can lead to solvency problems that look like liquidity (bank-run) crises. Regulatory forbearance incentivizes banks to both retain risky loans and reject new good opportunities. With sufficient regulatory forbearance, partially-insured banks act exactly as if they are fully insured. Stress tests certify that uninsured creditors will be paid, not solvency, and have ambiguous effects on the efficiency of investment.\",\"PeriodicalId\":145273,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Monetary Economics: Central Banks - Policies & Impacts eJournal\",\"volume\":\"219 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-08-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Monetary Economics: Central Banks - Policies & Impacts eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3915917\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Monetary Economics: Central Banks - Policies & Impacts eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3915917","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Banks' reluctance to repair their balance sheets, combined with deposit insurance and regulatory forbearance in recognizing greater risks and losses, can lead to solvency problems that look like liquidity (bank-run) crises. Regulatory forbearance incentivizes banks to both retain risky loans and reject new good opportunities. With sufficient regulatory forbearance, partially-insured banks act exactly as if they are fully insured. Stress tests certify that uninsured creditors will be paid, not solvency, and have ambiguous effects on the efficiency of investment.