误诊银行资本问题

Jeremy I. Bulow, P. Klemperer, Stanford GSB Submitter
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引用次数: 0

摘要

银行不愿修复其资产负债表,加上存款保险和监管机构对承认更大风险和损失的容忍,可能导致看起来像流动性(银行挤兑)危机的偿付能力问题。监管宽容激励银行既保留高风险贷款,又拒绝新的好机会。有了足够的监管宽容度,部分保险的银行就会像完全保险一样行事。压力测试证明,没有保险的债权人将得到偿付,而不是偿付能力,这对投资效率产生了模糊的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Misdiagnosing Bank Capital Problems
Banks' reluctance to repair their balance sheets, combined with deposit insurance and regulatory forbearance in recognizing greater risks and losses, can lead to solvency problems that look like liquidity (bank-run) crises. Regulatory forbearance incentivizes banks to both retain risky loans and reject new good opportunities. With sufficient regulatory forbearance, partially-insured banks act exactly as if they are fully insured. Stress tests certify that uninsured creditors will be paid, not solvency, and have ambiguous effects on the efficiency of investment.
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