{"title":"国防和早期重整部长,1936-1937年","authors":"Christopher W. Miller","doi":"10.5949/LIVERPOOL/9781786940667.003.0009","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter looks at the appointment of a minister to oversee defence planning (Thomas Inskip), but mainly focuses on the lack of progress in 1936 and how this was allowed to occur. The work of Lord Weir – perhaps the most influential civilian adviser in the government – and the bottlenecks in construction he sought to alleviate are discussed. Finally, the role of the Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture of Armaments, which was effectively derailed despite enormous public interest in removing private profit from warfare, is examined.","PeriodicalId":220377,"journal":{"name":"Planning and Profits","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Minister for Coordination of Defence and Early Rearmament, 1936–1937\",\"authors\":\"Christopher W. Miller\",\"doi\":\"10.5949/LIVERPOOL/9781786940667.003.0009\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter looks at the appointment of a minister to oversee defence planning (Thomas Inskip), but mainly focuses on the lack of progress in 1936 and how this was allowed to occur. The work of Lord Weir – perhaps the most influential civilian adviser in the government – and the bottlenecks in construction he sought to alleviate are discussed. Finally, the role of the Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture of Armaments, which was effectively derailed despite enormous public interest in removing private profit from warfare, is examined.\",\"PeriodicalId\":220377,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Planning and Profits\",\"volume\":\"8 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Planning and Profits\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5949/LIVERPOOL/9781786940667.003.0009\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Planning and Profits","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5949/LIVERPOOL/9781786940667.003.0009","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Minister for Coordination of Defence and Early Rearmament, 1936–1937
This chapter looks at the appointment of a minister to oversee defence planning (Thomas Inskip), but mainly focuses on the lack of progress in 1936 and how this was allowed to occur. The work of Lord Weir – perhaps the most influential civilian adviser in the government – and the bottlenecks in construction he sought to alleviate are discussed. Finally, the role of the Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture of Armaments, which was effectively derailed despite enormous public interest in removing private profit from warfare, is examined.