S. R, Ashutosh Pattanaik, Anshul Gupta, A. Kanavalli
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引用次数: 2
摘要
软件定义网络SDN (Software Defined Networks)提供了数据平面和控制平面的分离,可用于实现各种网络解决方案,如流量工程、入侵检测负载均衡等。然而,与SDN相关的问题很少需要解决,其中之一是对集中式控制器的分布式拒绝服务(DDoS)攻击。许多研究人员为识别和减轻此类攻击提供了各种解决方案。然而,入侵者经常找到执行此类DDoS攻击的新方法,因此检测此类攻击需要更多的时间和资源。在本文中,目的是演示如何通过被破坏的交换机在SDN控制器上发起DDoS攻击,这些交换机的空闲和硬超时值被操纵以向控制器发送重复的流表输入请求。此外,还提出了在第二次重复请求中检测此类攻击并立即减轻攻击的解决方案。该解决方案的效率很高,可以立即检测到攻击,而不是根据流量进入请求的数量计算阈值来识别流量是攻击流量还是真实流量。
Early Detection and Diminution of DDoS attack instigated by compromised switches on the controller in Software Defined Networks
Software Defined Networks (SDN) provides separation of data plane and control plane, which can be used for implementing various network solutions like traffic engineering, intrusion detection load balancing, etc. However, there are few issues relating to SDN that needs to be addressed, one of them being Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on the centralized controller. Many researchers have contributed various solutions for identifying and mitigating such attacks. However, the intruders often find new ways of performing such DDoS attacks and hence the detection of such attacks takes more time and resources. In this paper, the aim is to demonstrate how a DDoS attack can be initiated on an SDN controller by the compromised switches whose idle and hard timeout values are manipulated to send repeated flow table entry requests to the controller. Furthermore, a solution is also proposed to detect such an attack within the second repeated request and mitigate it immediately. This solution is highly efficient as the attack is detected instantly instead of calculating a threshold based on the number of flow entry requests to identify whether the traffic is attack traffic or a genuine one.