有破产保护福利的朋友

Kristoph Kleiner, Noah Stoffman, Scott E. Yonker
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引用次数: 7

摘要

摘要我们表明,信息溢出限制了有针对性的债务减免计划的有效性。我们研究了那些从最近申请破产保护的同事那里了解到债务减免可能性的个人。破产的贵族可以清偿债务,而面临解雇的贵族则失去所有保护。利用法官对破产案件的随机分配,我们确定有“解雇同伴”的个人申请破产或进入止赎的可能性显着降低。我们强调了将社交网络与家庭财务联系起来的新渠道,并确定了对贷款人施加个人债务减免的额外成本。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Friends with Bankruptcy Protection Benefits
Abstract We show information spillovers limit the effectiveness of targeted debt relief programs. We study individuals who learn about the likelihood of debt relief from the recent experiences of workplace peers filing for bankruptcy protection. Peers granted bankruptcy can discharge debts, while peers facing dismissal lose all protections. Exploiting the random assignment of judges to bankruptcy cases, we determine that individuals with a “dismissed peer” are significantly less likely to file for bankruptcy or enter foreclosure. We highlight a novel channel relating social networks to household finances and identify additional costs of granting individual debt relief imposed on lenders.
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