{"title":"亚里士多德的实践真理","authors":"S. Broadie","doi":"10.5840/ACPQ20163284","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In explaining the nature of phronēsis in Nicomachean Ethics 6, Aristotle invokes what he calls ‘practical truth’. The paper distinguishes and adjudicates between several interpretations of the puzzling phrase, including that of G. E. M. Anscombe. Its main tool of analysis is a distinction between semantic or assertoric truth, and truth in some richer-than-semantic sense. This distinction is illustrated from Aristotelian texts outside the Nicomachean Ethics. In conclusion, the paper reflects on the question of what the notion of practical truth contributes to the argument of the Nicomachean Ethics.","PeriodicalId":371138,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume 57","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Practical Truth in Aristotle\",\"authors\":\"S. Broadie\",\"doi\":\"10.5840/ACPQ20163284\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In explaining the nature of phronēsis in Nicomachean Ethics 6, Aristotle invokes what he calls ‘practical truth’. The paper distinguishes and adjudicates between several interpretations of the puzzling phrase, including that of G. E. M. Anscombe. Its main tool of analysis is a distinction between semantic or assertoric truth, and truth in some richer-than-semantic sense. This distinction is illustrated from Aristotelian texts outside the Nicomachean Ethics. In conclusion, the paper reflects on the question of what the notion of practical truth contributes to the argument of the Nicomachean Ethics.\",\"PeriodicalId\":371138,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume 57\",\"volume\":\"57 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-03-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume 57\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5840/ACPQ20163284\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume 57","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ACPQ20163284","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
In explaining the nature of phronēsis in Nicomachean Ethics 6, Aristotle invokes what he calls ‘practical truth’. The paper distinguishes and adjudicates between several interpretations of the puzzling phrase, including that of G. E. M. Anscombe. Its main tool of analysis is a distinction between semantic or assertoric truth, and truth in some richer-than-semantic sense. This distinction is illustrated from Aristotelian texts outside the Nicomachean Ethics. In conclusion, the paper reflects on the question of what the notion of practical truth contributes to the argument of the Nicomachean Ethics.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
