大型聚合博弈中的最佳回复动态

PSN: Game Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-01-28 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2210080

Y. Babichenko

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引用次数: 8

摘要

我们考虑具有大量玩家n的小影响聚合博弈。对于这类博弈，我们给出了具有以下两个属性的最佳响应动态。首先，动态达到纳什近似均衡的速度很快(对于某个常数c>0，最多cn log n步)。其次，对于某常数c'>0，动态系统的极限频率至少为1-e-c'n，达到纳什近似均衡。

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Best-Reply Dynamic in Large Aggregative Games

We consider small-influence aggregative games with a large number of players n. For this class of games we present a best-reply dynamic with the following two properties. First, the dynamic reaches Nash approximate equilibria fast (in at most cn log n steps for some constant c>0). Second, Nash approximate equilibria are played by the dynamic with a limit frequency of at least 1-e-c'n for some constant c'>0.

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PSN: Game Theory (Topic)

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