隐蔽信道检测方法

Adrián Ondov, P. Helebrandt
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引用次数: 0

摘要

现代网络世界每天都在更频繁地暴露于许多风险之中。大多数系统强烈依赖于在整个端点利用过程中保持匿名。隐蔽通道存在风险,因为它们利用合法通信和网络协议来逃避典型的过滤。这种防火墙规避机制看到,入侵者经常使用隐蔽通道与他们所破坏的系统进行恶意通信,因此对网络安全构成了真正的威胁。虽然有商业工具来保护计算机网络,但汽车连接和V2X等新应用带来了新的挑战。本文重点分析了最近使用隐蔽信道和检测隐蔽信道的方法,同时也分析了针对隐蔽信道的最新保护方法。我们通过向标准网络通信中注入ICMP流量来模拟时序隐蔽信道行为。最重要的是,我们专注于增强防火墙的检测和预防这种攻击的内置功能。本文的主要贡献是利用基于统计分析的检测方法对隐蔽信道威胁进行定时检测。将这些检测方法组合并实现在一个程序中作为一个简单的基于主机的入侵检测系统(HIDS)。因此,提出的设计可以分析和检测时序隐蔽通道,并采取预防措施阻止任何未来破坏终端设备安全性的企图。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Covert Channel Detection Methods
The modern networking world is being exposed to many risks more frequently every day. Most of systems strongly rely on remaining anonymous throughout the whole endpoint exploitation process. Covert channels represent risk since they ex-ploit legitimate communications and network protocols to evade typical filtering. This firewall avoidance sees covert channels frequently used for malicious communication of intruders with systems they compromised, and thus a real threat to network security. While there are commercial tools to safeguard computer networks, novel applications such as automotive connectivity and V2X present new challenges. This paper focuses on the analysis of the recent ways of using covert channels and detecting them, but also on the state-of-the-art possibilities of protection against them. We investigate observing the timing covert channels behavior simulated via injected ICMP traffic into standard network communications. Most importantly, we concentrate on enhancing firewall with detection and prevention of such attack built-in features. The main contribution of the paper is design for detection timing covert channel threats utilizing detection methods based on statistical analysis. These detection methods are combined and implemented in one program as a simple host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS). As a result, the proposed design can analyze and detect timing covert channels, with the addition of taking preventive measures to block any future attempts to breach the security of an end device.
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