Identification of Actions as a Factor in Attributing Moral Responsibility

In this paper I analyse some theoretical problems with identification of actions as concrete events which possess certain features. I show that the result of such identification can be a significant factor in attributing moral responsibility to an agent. In the first two sections I explore the problem of tracing the boundaries of actions in space and time and the theoreti­cal option that actions can have spatial and temporal parts. In the third section I explore three approaches to what are the features of actions that allow distinguishing them from all other types of events and from each other. Such features can be defined as: the presence of an agent; the presence of a control over agent’s body movements, taking into account their accessible alternatives and their possible consequences; the presence of an agent’s in­tentional state that precedes or accompanies the performance of certain body movements. In the light of these possible factors for identifying actions, in the third part of the article I show the features of internalist and externalist approaches to the concept of action. I draw a conclusion that possession of justification which is required for identifying actions by these approaches turns out to be so problematic in practice, that it makes reasonable to as­sign moral responsibility on the basis of a naive approach that identifies actions with move­ments of the agent’s body.