3人Diner's Dilemma游戏中的信任与情境意识

Yun Teng, Rashaad E. T. Jones, L. Marusich, J. O'Donovan, Cleotilde González, Tobias Höllerer
{"title":"3人Diner's Dilemma游戏中的信任与情境意识","authors":"Yun Teng, Rashaad E. T. Jones, L. Marusich, J. O'Donovan, Cleotilde González, Tobias Höllerer","doi":"10.1109/COGSIMA.2013.6523817","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the relationship between trust and Situation Awareness (SA) in a 3-Player Iterated Diner's Dilemma game. We ran an experiment in which 24 participants each played against two computer opponents for six blocks of gameplay, with different opponent strategies in each block. Based on SA theory and design principles, we developed three different user interfaces, each supporting a specific SA Level. Each SA Level is inclusive of components from the previous level(s). We assess several trust-related metrics during the study, including percentage of cooperation over time and subjective level of self-reported trust towards the opponents, and analyze the interdependencies of trust, SA, and opponent strategy. Results from the experiment reveal highest levels of cooperation at SA Level 1 overall, and a higher level of cooperation for the group of cooperation-encouraging opponent strategies at SA Level 1 and 2 compared to cooperation-discouraging strategies. There is also a positive relationship between self-reported trust in the opponents and cooperation behavior for these strategies, but this relationship was not present in the cooperation-discouraging group. These results show that participants do respond to strategy type in terms of behavior, and that cooperation level is an indicator of the trust that participants place in the opponent players when cooperation emerges.","PeriodicalId":243766,"journal":{"name":"2013 IEEE International Multi-Disciplinary Conference on Cognitive Methods in Situation Awareness and Decision Support (CogSIMA)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"14","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Trust and Situation Awareness in a 3-Player Diner's Dilemma game\",\"authors\":\"Yun Teng, Rashaad E. T. Jones, L. Marusich, J. O'Donovan, Cleotilde González, Tobias Höllerer\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/COGSIMA.2013.6523817\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper studies the relationship between trust and Situation Awareness (SA) in a 3-Player Iterated Diner's Dilemma game. We ran an experiment in which 24 participants each played against two computer opponents for six blocks of gameplay, with different opponent strategies in each block. Based on SA theory and design principles, we developed three different user interfaces, each supporting a specific SA Level. Each SA Level is inclusive of components from the previous level(s). We assess several trust-related metrics during the study, including percentage of cooperation over time and subjective level of self-reported trust towards the opponents, and analyze the interdependencies of trust, SA, and opponent strategy. Results from the experiment reveal highest levels of cooperation at SA Level 1 overall, and a higher level of cooperation for the group of cooperation-encouraging opponent strategies at SA Level 1 and 2 compared to cooperation-discouraging strategies. There is also a positive relationship between self-reported trust in the opponents and cooperation behavior for these strategies, but this relationship was not present in the cooperation-discouraging group. These results show that participants do respond to strategy type in terms of behavior, and that cooperation level is an indicator of the trust that participants place in the opponent players when cooperation emerges.\",\"PeriodicalId\":243766,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2013 IEEE International Multi-Disciplinary Conference on Cognitive Methods in Situation Awareness and Decision Support (CogSIMA)\",\"volume\":\"34 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2013-06-06\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"14\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2013 IEEE International Multi-Disciplinary Conference on Cognitive Methods in Situation Awareness and Decision Support (CogSIMA)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/COGSIMA.2013.6523817\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2013 IEEE International Multi-Disciplinary Conference on Cognitive Methods in Situation Awareness and Decision Support (CogSIMA)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/COGSIMA.2013.6523817","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 14

摘要

本文研究了3人迭代用餐困境博弈中信任与情境感知的关系。我们进行了一项实验,其中24名参与者分别在6个游戏块中与2个电脑对手进行游戏,每个游戏块中有不同的对手策略。基于SA理论和设计原则,我们开发了三种不同的用户界面,每种界面都支持特定的SA Level。每个SA级别都包括前一个级别的组件。在研究过程中,我们评估了几个与信任相关的指标,包括随时间推移的合作百分比和自我报告的对对手信任的主观水平,并分析了信任、SA和对手策略的相互依赖性。实验结果显示,总体而言,在情景认知水平1的合作水平最高,并且在情景认知水平1和2中,鼓励合作的对手策略组的合作水平高于不鼓励合作的对手策略组。自我报告对对手的信任与这些策略的合作行为之间也存在正相关关系,但这种关系在不合作组中不存在。这些结果表明,参与者在行为上确实对策略类型有反应,而合作水平是参与者在合作出现时对对手的信任程度的一个指标。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Trust and Situation Awareness in a 3-Player Diner's Dilemma game
This paper studies the relationship between trust and Situation Awareness (SA) in a 3-Player Iterated Diner's Dilemma game. We ran an experiment in which 24 participants each played against two computer opponents for six blocks of gameplay, with different opponent strategies in each block. Based on SA theory and design principles, we developed three different user interfaces, each supporting a specific SA Level. Each SA Level is inclusive of components from the previous level(s). We assess several trust-related metrics during the study, including percentage of cooperation over time and subjective level of self-reported trust towards the opponents, and analyze the interdependencies of trust, SA, and opponent strategy. Results from the experiment reveal highest levels of cooperation at SA Level 1 overall, and a higher level of cooperation for the group of cooperation-encouraging opponent strategies at SA Level 1 and 2 compared to cooperation-discouraging strategies. There is also a positive relationship between self-reported trust in the opponents and cooperation behavior for these strategies, but this relationship was not present in the cooperation-discouraging group. These results show that participants do respond to strategy type in terms of behavior, and that cooperation level is an indicator of the trust that participants place in the opponent players when cooperation emerges.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信