拉姆齐最优政策与财政货币相互作用下的多重均衡

Jean-Bernard Chatelain, K. Ralf
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引用次数: 7

摘要

我们考虑基于Leeper(1991)的无摩擦不变禀赋经济。在这个经济中,我们发现,在一个特别的货币规则和一个特别的财政规则下,存在两个均衡。一个是积极的货币政策和被动的财政政策,另一个是被动的货币政策和积极的财政政策。我们考虑了一个扩展的设置,其中政策制定者在准承诺下最小化损失函数,如Schaumburg和Tambalotti(2007)。在这一构想下,存在一种独特的拉姆齐均衡,即利率挂钩和被动财政政策。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Ramsey Optimal Policy versus Multiple Equilibria with Fiscal and Monetary Interactions
We consider a frictionless constant endowment economy based on Leeper (1991). In this economy, it is shown that, under an ad-hoc monetary rule and an ad-hoc fiscal rule, there are two equilibria. One has active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy, while the other has passive monetary policy and active fiscal policy. We consider an extended set-up in which the policy maker minimizes a loss function under quasi-commitment, as in Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007). Under this formulation there exists a unique Ramsey equilibrium, with an interest rate peg and a passive fiscal policy.
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